Survey of Recent Developments in New Jersey Law
In this survey section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents surveys of recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing the Law Review
hopes to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of interestingchanges
in significantareas of practice.
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TORT LAW-NewJersey Tort Claims Act-Plaintiff May Not Recover
Under the NewJersey Tort Claims Act for Pain and Suffering Unless
the Sustained Permanent Loss of a Bodily Function is
Substantial-Brooks v. Odom, 150 N.J. 395, 696 A.2d 619 (1997).
On November 18, 1991, plaintiff Bertha Brooks was injured
while attempting to enter her parked car on Clinton Place in Newark. See Brooks v. Odom, 150 N.J. 395, 398, 696 A.2d 619, 620 (1997).
A New Jersey Transit Bus struck the car door, thereby knocking the
plaintiff into her car. An ambulance transported Brooks to the
emergency room of a local hospital. Upon arrival, she complained
of pain in her head, neck, and back. The hospital x-rays were normal
except for "degenerative changes at C5-C6." The plaintiff was fitted
with a cervical collar, provided with a prescription for medication,
and then released from the hospital.
Subsequently, Brooks received medical care and treatment from
several physicians and specialists. At first, she received twelve heat
treatments for her back, all of which proved to be ineffective in relieving her pain. The plaintiff continued to experience headaches,
blurred vision, dizziness, pain in her left shoulder, stiffness in her
neck, and pain in her upper and lower back. Brooks also complained of discomfort as a result of changes in the weather.
In August 1992, an examination of plaintiff's neck and back revealed "mild flattening of the curve, tenderness and hardness, and
decreased motion." Id, 696 A.2d at 620-21. At that time, a doctor
diagnosed Brook's condition as "'residual of post-traumatic myositis
and fibromyositis of the cervicodorsal and lumbosacral region and
post-traumatic headache syndrome.'" Id at 398-99, 696 A.2d at 621.
Several months of physical therapy and nerve stimulation failed to
relieve the continued pain in the plaintiffs neck and back. See id. at
399, 696 A.2d at 621.
In February 1993, Brooks's physician concluded that prognosis
for any significant improvement in her condition was poor. See id. at
400, 696 A.2d at 621. The plaintiffs physician also concluded that
she had sustained a permanent and significant loss of function along
with chronic pain made worse by the normal activities of daily living.
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Moreover, the physician concluded that the plaintiff's condition was
a direct result of the accident.
After the accident, Brooks stayed home for a couple of weeks
and missed eight work days. Although she was able to return to
work as a teacher's aide, the plaintiff claimed that she could not
stand or sit for long periods of time without experiencing pain.
Brooks continued to experience headaches, dizziness, and severe
pain in her lower back that radiated into her left leg. As a result, the
plaintiff had difficulty performing household chores that required
bending or lifting, such as vacuuming and carrying groceries.
Brooks filed a complaint against the driver of the bus, Willie
Mae Odom, and the New Jersey Transit Corporation. See id. at 395,
696 A.2d at 621. The Port Authority of New York and NewJersey was
also named as a defendant; however, it was never served with a summons and a complaint. See id. at 401, 696 A.2d at 622. Brooks
sought to recover for pain and suffering. See id at 400, 696 A.2d at
621. She also sought to recover for copayment and deductible
amounts incurred under her own health insurance policy. See id, at
397, 696 A.2d at 620. In addition to Brooks's claims, her husband
asserted a derivative claim for the loss of her services. See id, at 400,
696 A.2d at 621. The defendants subsequently moved for summary
judgment. See id at 401, 696 A.2d at 622.
The NewJersey Superior Court, Law Division, granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Brooks's injuries did not constitute "a permanent loss of a bodily function" within
the meaning of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act).
See id, at 398, 696 A.2d at 620. The trial court also ruled that the
plaintiff was not entitled to recovery for copayment or deductible
amounts incurred under her insurance policy. See id, at 401, 696
A.2d at 622.
In an unpublished opinion, the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed the trial court's decision and held that the
plaintiff proffered objective evidence of her injury. See id. at 398,
401, 696 A.2d at 619, 622. Specifically, the court noted that Brooks
experienced loss of spinal curvature, muscle spasm, and marginal
spurs. See id, at 401, 696 A.2d at 622. Moreover, the appellate court
declared that the plaintiff's inability to stand or sit for long periods
of time coupled with the limitations she faced in performing household chores was sufficient evidence to establish that her injuries were
permanent. See id The court also ruled that the plaintiff could recover her expenditures for copayments and deductibles. See id.
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted defendants' petition
for certification. See id. at 398, 696 A.2d at 620. The court reversed
the appellate division's judgment and reinstated the judgment of the
trial court. See id. The court held that in order for a plaintiff to recover for pain and suffering under the Tort Claims Act he must sustain a "permanent loss of a bodily function" that is characterized as
substantial See id at 406, 696 A.2d at 624. The supreme court then
concluded that Brooks did not sustain the requisite "permanent loss
of a bodily function" within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act. See
id The court further held that the plaintiff could not recover her
copayment and deductible expenses. See id
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Pollock began the opinion with a discussion of the appropriate definition of the terms
"permanent," "loss," "bodily," and "function." See id at 402, 696 A.2d
at 622. The justice noted that in the absence of any statutory definitions the court may look to dictionaries for assistance in revealing
the legislature's intended meaning of those terms. See id. In the aggregate, the court opined that a "loss of a bodily function" is defined
as the act of either losing or decreasing in amount, degree, or magnitude the action performed by cells, tissues, organs, or systems of
organs in the body. See id The supreme court found the dictionary
definitions helpful but not dispositive. See id.
The court then turned its attention to the history and purpose
of the Tort Claims Act. See id First and foremost, Justice Pollock declared that the purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to "reestablish the
general rule of the immunity of public entities from liability for injuries to others." Id The supreme court acknowledged that the driving force behind the legislature's reenactment of immunity was concern about the adverse impact that increased liability imposed on the
public coffers. See id Justice Pollock concluded that the legislative
branch intended a cautious and guarded interpretation of all public
entities' exposure to liability. See id.
Justice Pollock then outlined the standard previously established to recover for pain and suffering under the Tort Claims Act.
See id. at 402, 403, 696 A.2d at 622, 623. First, the justice opined that
a plaintiff must prove with objective medical evidence that he sustained a permanent injury. See id at 402-03, 696 A.2d at 622-23. Second, the court stressed that temporary injuries, regardless of severity,
are not recoverable. See id at 403, 696 A.2d at 623. Finally, the supreme court affirmed that a plaintiff cannot recover for mere
"'subjective feelings of discomfort.'" Id (quoting Ayers v. Township of
Jackson, 106 NJ. 557, 571, 525 A.2d 287, 294 (1987)).
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Next, the court reviewed prior appellate court decisions that
considered the term "permanent" within the meaning of the Tort
Claims Act. See id. Justice Pollock recognized that the appellate
court ruled that a claim for emotional distress that manifests itself
"'in permanent physical sequelae such as disabling tremors, paralysis
or loss of eyesight'" is recoverable under the Tort Claims Act. Id.
(citing Srebnik v. State, 245 NJ. Super. 344, 351, 585 A.2d 950, 954
(App. Div. 1991)). The justice also cited a case in which the appellate division held that a permanent loss of taste or smell satisfied the
statutory standard. See id. (citing Mack v. PassaicValley Water Comm'n,
294 NJ. Super. 592, 600, 684 A.2d 77, 82 (App. Div. 1996)).
In the present case, Justice Pollock stated that, in concluding
that Brooks sustained a "permanent loss of a bodily function," the
appellate court relied on prior decisions interpreting the verbal
threshold provisions of the No-Fault Act. See ie. The supreme court
recognized that under both the Tort Claims Act and the No-Fault Act
a plaintiff must proffer objective evidence of his injuries. See i&. at
404, 696 A.2d at 623. The court, however, was quick to point out
that the substantive standards in both statutes differ. See id.
The supreme court next stressed that under the Tort Claims Act
recovery for pain and suffering is limited to cases where the plaintiff
sustained either permanent disfigurement, dismemberment, or
"permanent loss of a bodily function." Id. (citing NJ. Stat. Ann. §
59:9-2(d) (West 1992)). In comparison, Justice Pollock explained
that the No-Fault Act allows recovery for nine different categories of
injuries with varying degrees of severity. See id., 696 A.2d at 623-24
(citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:6A-8(a) (West 1990)). Moreover, the justice recognized that a plaintiff is permitted to merge the required
elements of one category into one of the remaining eight categories.
See id. at 405, 696 A.2d at 624.
The court noted that category six in the No-Fault Act dealing
with "permanent loss of the use of a body organ, member, function
or system" is the most comparable standard to the Tort Claims Act in
analyzing the phrase "permanent loss of a bodily function." Id. at
404-05, 696 A.2d at 624. According to Justice Pollock, however, there
are no reported cases where a plaintiff has recovered under category
six alone. See id at 405, 696 A.2d at 624. Rather, the justice determined that plaintiffs who seek recovery under category six concurrently seek recovery under other categories. See id. For example, the
court pointed to categories seven and eight, which allow recovery for
the permanent or significant limitation of use of a body function,
organ, member, or system. See id As such, the supreme court rea-
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soned that a plaintiff seeking recovery under the No-Fault Act may
recover for sustaining a permanent injury that only limits the use of
his back. See id at 405-06, 696 A.2d at 624. Thus, Justice Pollock
surmised that under the No-Fault Act the legislative intent was to allow recovery for injuries resulting in something less than a
"'permanent loss of the use of a body organ, member, function or
system.'" Id at 406, 696 A.2d at 624.
With respect to the Tort Claims Act, however, the court found
that the legislature intended no such modification of the required
"'permanent loss of a bodily function'" standard. See id Justice Pollock first acknowledged that the legislative intent is not completely
clear. See id. The justice also inferred from the absence of contrary
language that it was doubtful that the legislature intended to limit
recovery to injuries resulting in a total permanent loss of use. See id.
Notwithstanding, the supreme court proclaimed that the legislature
intended that, in order for a plaintiff to recover for pain and suffering under the Tort Claims Act, he must sustain a "permanent loss of
a bodily function" that is substantiaL See id.
In applying the court's reasoning to the facts of the case, Justice
Pollock determined that Brooks did not satisfy the statutory standard
set forth in the Tort Claims Act. See id. The justice accepted the
plaintiff's contention that she currently experiences pain and that
she sustained a permanent limitation of movement in both her neck
and back. See id. The court, however, also noted that the plaintiff
could still function as a homemaker and in her employment. See id
In short, the supreme court concluded that the plaintiff did not sustain a "'permanent loss of bodily function'" that was substantiaL See
id
Lastly, Justice Pollock quickly dispensed with the issue of
whether plaintiff could recover for copayment and deductible expenses under her Personal Injury Protection coverage. See id. The
justice noted that recovery for such expenses under the No-Fault Act
is prohibited. See id The court embraced the language of the NoFault Act and applied the same underlying policy considerations to
the Tort Claims Act. See id. at 406-07, 696 A.2d at 624-25. Specifically, Justice Pollock maintained that allowing such recovery against a
public entity would clog the courts with minor claims seeking reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses. See id. Moreover, the court
declared that it would indeed be contradictory to the general legislative intent to allow recovery against public entities when such expenses could not be recovered against private parties. See id. at 407,
696 A.2d at 625. Therefore, the supreme court held that under the
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Tort Claims Act the plaintiff could not recover her insurance copayment and deductible expenses because she did not otherwise qualify
for a claim. See id.
The Brooks opinion sends a clear message to all trial courts to
raise the shields to protect public entities from liability for injuries to
others. The court's decision also cautions plaintiffs' attorneys to
think twice before bringing suit against a public entity. The difficulty
of reaching this elevated statutory standard precludes most, if not all,
soft-tissue injuries. Or does it? The court reasoned that, in order to
recover against a public entity for pain and suffering, a plaintiff must
sustain an injury that constitutes a permanent loss of a bodily function that is substantial It is undisputed that Brooks sustained a
"permanent loss of a bodily function." Yet the court concluded that
Bertha Brooks could not recover for her injuries because she could
still function as a teacher's aide and as a homemaker.
Thus, the court apparently equates substantialwith the lasting
effect that the injury has on daily activities, rather than with the severity of the injury itself. Alternatively, the court was not convinced
that the pain and suffering associated with the limitations that
Brooks faced in her employment and at home justified a finding that
she suffered a loss of bodily function that was substantial. Had Bertha Brooks been faced with the continued care of a small child, or a
set of infant triplets, the court may have reached a different conclusion. If her injuries forced her to step aside from a career as a professional dancer, the court may have been motivated to find that her
loss of bodily function was substantial. Under the guise of the Brooks
decision, a plaintiff who sustains the exact medically defined injury as
that of Bertha Brooks may still recover against a public entity if he is
faced with a physically demanding employment or lifestyle.
The Brooks court stopped short of providing trial courts and
practitioners with the guidance necessary to frame properly a given
injury within the statutory standard. The court's opinion is likely to
result in an overly restrictive application of the standard. At the very
least, Brooks will result in inconsistent rulings at the trial court level.
RichardP. Earley
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COMMERCIAL LAW-Remedies-Purchasers are Limited to the
Remedies Afforded by the Uniform Commercial Code and are
Barred from Pursuing Tort Actions Where the Product is Defective
and the Only Loss that Occurs is to the Product-Alloway v. General
MarineIndus., 149 N.J. 620, 695 A.2d 264 (1997).
On July 14, 1990, plaintiff Samuel P. Alloway purchased a new
thirty-three foot boat from Mullica River Boat Basin (Mullica) for
$61,070. See Alloway v. General Marine Indus., 149 N.J. 620, 624, 695
A.2d 264, 266 (1997). Mullica had obtained the boat from the
manufacturer, Century Boats (Century), a division of Glasstream
Boats, Inc. (Glasstream). See i&. at 623, 695 A.2d at 265. Century expressly warranted that the boat was free from defects for a period of
twelve months. See id,. at 624, 695 A.2d at 266. Alloway insured the
boat with New Hampshire Insurance Co. (New Hampshire).
Three months after Alloway purchased the boat, the boat sank
while docked at a marina in Manahawkin, New Jersey. The only
damage was to the boat itself; no property damage or personal injuries occurred as a result of the boat sinking. New Hampshire paid
$40,106.63 for the boat's repairs and Alloway paid part of his deductible toward the repairs. After the boat was fixed, Alloway was
able to procure a trade-in credit of $38,770 towards the purchase
price of a new boat.
Subsequently, Alloway sued Mullica and General Marine Industries, Inc. (GMI), the successor to the manufacturer Glasstream. See
it& Alloway assigned the portion of the claim dealing with the cost of
repairs to New Hampshire but reserved to himself the claim for the
boat's loss in value. See id. Both Alloway and New Hampshire alleged a breach of warranty claim against Mullica for breaching the
manufacturer's warranty, along with a negligence and strict liability
claim against Century. See id Alloway then settled with Mullica,
eliminating the breach of warranty claim. See id. at 625, 695 A.2d at
266-67.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, granted GMI's
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a
claim. See id., 695 A.2d at 266. The court based the decision on
Spring Motors Distributors v. Ford Motor Co., which precludes a purchaser from suing in strict liability for purely economic loss. See id.
(citing 98 NJ. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985)). The trial court also referenced an appellate decision, D'Angelo v. Miller Yacht Sales, where the
appellate court found that a consumer's purchase of a yacht was lim-
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ited to the Uniform Commercial Code's (UCC's) exclusive remedy
for breach of warranty. See i& (citing 261 NJ. Super. 683, 619 A.2d
689 (App. Div. 1993)). The law division therefore concluded that
the manufacturer was not liable because the plaintiffs were only seeking to recover for economic loss. See id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed.
See id, 695 A.2d at 267. The court rejected the holding in DAngelo,
observing that the appellate court must follow another supreme
court case, Santor v. A&MKaragheusian,Inc. See id. (citing 44 NJ. 52,
207 A.2d 305 (1965)). The appellate division observed that Santor
mandated the preclusion of strict liability claims for commercial
purchasers only. See id. at 625-26, 695 A.2d at 267. The court also
remarked that the suit against GMI was appropriate under the principle of successor liability. See i& at 626, 695 A.2d at 267. In sum, the
appellate court held that the plaintiffs could pursue a claim for economic loss under both negligence and strict liability theories. See id
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification. See id. at
623, 695 A.2d at 266. The supreme court reversed the appellate division and held that the plaintiffs were barred from pursuing tort actions for economic loss resulting from a defect that injured only the
boat itself. See id, at 643, 695 A.2d at 275.
Writing for the majority, Justice Pollock began by categorizing
the relevant issue as whether the plaintiffs could avail themselves of
tort claims to recover from the manufacturer's successor for the loss
of their benefit of the bargain. See id. at 627, 695 A.2d at 267. To answer this question, the justice indicated that the court's analysis must
initially determine whether contract or tort principles are more appropriate in allocating the risk between a consumer and a manufacturer. See i& The majority then opined that contract principles are
generally better suited to claims of damage resulting to the product
itself whereas tort theories are proper when the harm is to persons or
other property. See id. at 627, 628, 695 A.2d at 267-68. The court
reasoned that contract remedies are intended to protect consensual
relations and the expectations of the parties. See id. at 628, 695 A.2d
at 268. By contrast, the supreme court further explained that tort
theories are best left to questions involving risks of accidental harm.
See id,
The court continued by pointing out the relevance of two factors--the parties' relative bargaining power and which party is better
suited to bear the risk of harm. See id. The supreme court noted
that a purchaser is in a better position to carry the risk of economic
loss. See id. The majority further remarked that not only is a luxury
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boat hardly a necessity, but there was no evidence showing that Alloway was in any way disadvantaged when dealing with Mullica. See id.
at 629, 695 A.2d at 268. Justice Pollock added that Alloway was also
able to protect himself by allocating the risk to an insurance company. See id
The court then reviewed the role of the legislature in enacting
the UGG. See id The majority proffered that the legislature intended the UCC to act as a comprehensive system to address the
remedies for consumer loss resulting from the purchase of a defective product. See id By enacting this legislation, Justice Pollock surmised, the legislature already weighed the balance of risk allocation
between purchaser and seller/manufacturer. See id, 695 A.2d at 26869. The justice illustrated the UCC remedies by noting the provisions regarding express and implied warranties and the sections allowing for consequential and incidental damages. See id. at 630, 695
A.2d at 269. The supreme court also explained how the manufacturer is able to limit liability through disclaimers. See id
The majority then commenced a review of past case law. See id
The court revisited Santorand noted that this decision was pre-UCC
and has been called into question by many courts. See id. at 630, 631,
695 A2d at 269. Justice Pollock articulated that the courts opposed
to Santor have reasoned that strict liability should not undermine the
remedies in the UCG but should be limited to those situations dealing with damage other than simply economic loss. See id. at 631, 695

A.2d at 269. The justice then reiterated that contract principles
should govern when there is only damage to the product. See id at
632, 695 A.2d at 270.
The supreme court next undertook an exhaustive survey of case
law from otherjurisdictions. See id at 633, 695 A.2d at 270. The majority found that most courts have advocated that a buyer should be
limited to collect under contract principles, regardless of whether
the purchaser is a commercial entity or a consumer. See id. Justice
Pollock further noted that only a small number of courts have followed Santor. See id. at 635, 695 A.2d at 271. Thejustice then looked
at the American Law Institute's (ALI's) definition of "economic loss"
and emphasized that it excluded tort recovery when the damage is
limited to the product itself. See id at 636, 695 A.2d at 272. Finally,
in highlighting three recent state court decisions from Alabama,
Florida, and Delaware, the majority stressed that these principles
have been applied in a consumer context. See id. at 637, 638, 695
A.2d at 272, 273.
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Next, Justice Pollock distinguished certain factual circumstances
that could warrant a different finding, although the justice emphasized that the court would not address these potential scenarios in
this decision. See id. at 638, 639, 695 A.2d at 273, 274. The majority
acknowledged that some cases may involve dangerous products or
situations where there is a great disparity in bargaining power between the parties. See id. at 639, 695 A.2d at 273. The supreme court
also distinguished cases that may involve fraud or unconscionability
and highlighted several state and federal consumer protection statutes. See id. at 639, 640, 641, 695 A.2d at 274. Justice Pollock observed that the UCC supplements the common law and that the aggrieved purchaser could still pursue a common-law fraud action or
an action under one of the consumer statutes. See id. at 63940, 695
A.2d at 274. The justice then concluded that allowing a tort action
for economic loss would be duplicative of UCC remedies and consumer protection statutes. See id. at 641, 695 A2d at 275.
The court then addressed the facts of the present case. See id. at
642, 695 A.2d at 275. Justice Pollock reiterated that the plaintiffs
sought compensation for economic loss only-the loss of value on
the trade-in price of the boat. See id. The justice focused on the risk
allocation of the parties. See id, The court explained that Alloway relied on the warranties provided by the boat dealer along with his insurance coverage through New Hampshire. See id. Further, the majority noted, Alloway had already been paid by both. See id. GMI on
the other hand, the court suggested, did not agree to accept any risk
or liability when purchasing the assets of Glasstream as a successor in
interest and thus did not factor the cost of this uncertain liability
into the purchase price of the assets. See id.
Justice Pollock next summarized that the UCC already dictates
the remedy for a defective product through express and implied warranties. See id. The justice added that purchasers can protect themselves further by purchasing insurance and that the absence of privity
of contract does not bar a buyer from pursuing a claim against the
manufacturer. See id. The court also pronounced that, in accordance with the great weight of legal authority, it would be extremely
unfair to subject the seller to tort liability when the only damage is
economic loss. See id. at 643, 695 A.2d at 275. The majority thus
held that the plaintiffs' strict liability and negligence claims were
barred. See id
Justice Handier, joined byJustice Stein, concurred in the result.
See id at 643, 646, 695 A.2d at 275, 276 (Handler, J., concurring).
Justice Handier began by commenting that, in a case where there is
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no real commercial disadvantage, it is appropriate to restrict the
purchaser's remedies to those available under the UCC. See i& at
644, 695 A.2d at 276 (Handler, J., concurring). The justice noted
that the holding was correct in this instance where the purchaser was
bargaining for a luxury boat. See id, Nonetheless, the concurrence
observed that purchasers frequently do not have bargaining power
close to that of the seller. See id In such circumstances, Justice
Handler asserted, sellers can take advantage of warranty disclaimers
that preclude any recovery. See id. Justice Handier therefore posited
that the purchaser may not always be in a better position to bear the
loss-an example of which may be the purchase of an expensive
oven or refrigerator. See i& at 645, 695 A.2d. at 276 & n.1 (Handier,
J., concurring).
The concurrence then claimed that this type of disparity can occur regardless of whether the purchaser is a consumer or commercial entity. See id, 695 A.2d. at 276 (Handier, J., concurring). Justice
Handler illustrated that there are certainly cases where the buyer,
and not the seller, will enjoy superior bargaining power and, by contrast, where a commercial buyer will be virtually powerless in the bargaining process. See id. In conclusion, the justice proposed a factsensitive determination as to whether a court should limit the available remedies to those afforded by the UCC. See i&.
The majority was correct in limiting recovery for economic loss
to that afforded by the UCC. Justice Handler's fears of exploitation
are unfounded. The market will dictate what warranties will be available to consumers, despite the lack of individual bargaining power.
Currently, in order to remain competitive, all major brand names
typically offer warranties with the sale of their products. Thus, consumers as a group do demand a good degree of bargaining power.
Where they do not, the majority aptly observed that there are numerous state and federal consumer protections in effect that guaranty certain minimum standards of conduct by sellers. Similarly, for
the commercial purchaser who is at a great bargaining disadvantage,
this entity can attempt to argue that the contract was unconscionable-although admittedly unconscionability is rarely found in cases
dealing with nonconsumers.
In addition, by allowing uncertainty in damage awards against
sellers, the increased cost attached to potential liabilities will only be
passed down to the purchasers. Furthermore, as the majority observed, purchasers are not limited to the UCC when there is damage
to property other than the product or where personal injuries are involved. Thus, by leaving the parties only with the remedies afforded
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under the UCC for economic loss, the courts are justifiably protecting the risk allocations bargained for and relied upon by both.
Kathleen D. Fuentes
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ZONING AND PLANNING-Land Use Variance-Applicants
Seeking a Land Use Variance for the Erection of Telecommunications Towers and Monopoles Must Satisfy Positive Criteria by
Proving Particular Suitability of the Site and Opponents Alleging
Decline in Property Values Must Prove it by Expert TestimonySmart SMR v. FairLawn Bd. of Adjustment, 152 N.J. 309, 704 A.2d 1271
(1998).
Plaintiff-respondent Smart SMR of New York, Inc. (Smart) was
licensed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to install a digital telecommunications system in the New York metropolitan area. See Smart SMR v. FairLawn Bd. of Adjustment, 152 NJ. 309,
316, 704 A.2d 1271, 1275 (1998). The system would provide the
general public a digital alternative to the cellular telephone. See id
at 318, 704 A.2d at 1276. In order for the system to be operative,
Smart sought to build a 140-foot telecommunications monopole in
one of defendant-petitioner Borough of Fair Lawn's industrial zones.
See id. at 314, 704 A.2d at 1274. Fair Lawn zoning regulations prohibit structures of more than forty feet in height except for public
utility structures. See id at 317, 704 A.2d at 1275. The Fair Lawn
Planning Board (Board) refused to recognize Smart as a public utility company and also denied its request for a land use variance. See
id at 317, 321, 704 A.2d at 1275, 1277. Smart then filed an action to
reverse the town's decision. See id. at 321, 704 A.2d at 1277.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, affirmed the
Board's decision and dismissed the plaintiff-respondent's complaint.
See id. The trial court declared that the construction of the monopole was a commercial use and was not inherently beneficial. See
id,
The NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the
trial court on the public utility issue but reversed on the issue of land
use variance. See id. at 321-22, 704 A.2d at 1277. The court held that
Smart satisfied both the positive and the negative criteria for obtaining a land use variance and that a variance should therefore have
been granted. See id. at 322, 704 A.2d at 1277-78. The town then petitioned the Supreme Court of New Jersey for certification on the issue of land use variance and Smart cross-petitioned on the public
utility issue. See id. The supreme court denied the certification on
Smart's request to be treated as a public utility company but granted
certification on the issue of land use variance. See id. at 314, 317, 704
A.2d at 1274, 1275.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed that the defendantpetitioner should have granted a use variance to Smart. See i& at
334, 704 A.2d at 1284. Although the supreme court refused to recognize telecommunications facilities as inherently beneficial, the
court nevertheless held that Smart satisfied the positive criteria for a
land use variance because the site was particularly suitable for the intended use. See id. at 332, 704 A.2d at 1283. The court also found
that Smart complied with the negative criteria for a land use variance
because the variance would not cause a substantial detriment to the
community. See id. The supreme court further opined that the adverse impact of radioactive emissions had been preempted by federal
and state laws and that expert testimony was required to show a
negative impact on property values. See id. at 333, 334, 704 A.2d at
1283, 1284.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Pollock explained that
the positive criteria are "'special reasons'" why the land use variance
should be granted. See id. at 323, 704 A.2d at 1278 (citation omitted). The justice observed that uses that are inherently beneficial
presumptively satisfy the positive criteria. See id. Otherwise, the
court noted, the positive criteria are fulfilled if the use promotes or
advances the general welfare. See id. The court further remarked
that the general welfare is promoted if the proposed site is particularly suited for the proposed use. See id. The negative criteria, continued Justice Pollock, can be fulfilled if the variance complies with
two conditions. See id First, the justice stated, the variance must not
inflict substantial detriment on the public good. See id Second, the
court explained, the variance must not substantially impair the intent or purpose of the zoning ordinance and master plan. See id
The supreme court observed that to meet this second condition the
proof required should be of an "'enhanced quality'" unless the use is
inherently beneficial. See id (citation omitted).
Starting with the positive criteria, Justice Pollock agreed with
Smart that mobile communications facilities are inherently beneficial. See id at 329, 704 A.2d at 1281. The justice realized that the
court may have to acknowledge this status sooner or later. See id For
four reasons, however, the justice reluctantly refused to recognize
such status at this time. See id First, the court recognized, such facilities are commercial and the court hesitated to grant preferential
status to commercial uses. See id. Second, Justice Pollock suggested
that the grant of such preferential status within a municipality
should be limited in number. See id, The justice expressed concern
over opening the floodgates to similar mobile communications facilities and thereby imposing a burden on municipalities because of the
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lack of information regarding the demand for the establishment of
such sites. See id. at 330, 704 A.2d at 1282. Third, the supreme court
worried about the total loss of control over telecommunications
companies. See id. The court remarked that most facilities require
state certification to attain the status of being inherently beneficial.
See id. Justice Pollock, however, observed that regulation of the telecommunications industry is preempted by federal regulations and
state certification is not allowed. See id. Fourth, the justice realized
that the size and height of the monopoles and radio transmission
towers can constitute a legitimate local concern. See id. at 331, 704
A.2d at 1282. Consequently, at this stage, the supreme court declined to give a blanket approval to the building of communications
towers and monopoles. See i4. Instead, the court suggested employing a case by case approach. See Uet
Justice Pollock then opined that although mobile communications facilities are not inherently beneficial they may still satisfy the
positive criteria if the proposed site is particularly suited for the intended use. See id at 332, 704 A.2d at 1283. The justice declared
that the proposed site in this case satisfies the positive criteria because (1) it is an industrial zone surrounded by nonresidential uses
on three sides, (2) it already has an existing ninety-foot monopole,
and (3) the proposed 140-foot monopole will merely replace the
shorter ninety-foot monopole. See id.
Next, the supreme court examined the negative criteria to ensure that the grant of a use variance would not constitute a substantial detriment to the public good. See id. In so doing, the court considered the aspects of aesthetics, radiation, and property values. See
i&e In considering the issue of aesthetics, Justice Pollock found that
the new monopole would not substantially alter the town's skyline
because it would merely replace an existing monopole and the fiftyfoot increase in height is insubstantial. See id. at 333, 704 A.2d at
1283. Regarding concerns over radiation emissions, the justice asserted that the proposed area had been preempted by federal and
state regulations and Smart met both jurisdictions' standards. See id.
Agreeing with the expert testimony, the court noted that property
values would not be adversely affected. See id at 334, 704 A.2d at
1284. The supreme court therefore concluded that the grant of a
use variance to Smart would not cause a substantial detriment to the
public good. See id.
Furthermore, the court agreed that Smart should be granted a
use variance for the monopole because it met both the positive and
the negative criteria. See id. Noting that there are widespread dis-
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putes between municipalities and telecommunications companies in
this area, the supreme court offered guidelines for future cases. See
id. at 336, 704 A.2d at 1285. Justice Pollock declared that telecommunications companies must satisfy both the positive and the negative criteria before they can obtain a use variance. See i& The justice
recognized that, although holders of an FCC license can generally be
considered as satisfying the positive criteria, the applicant for a use
variance for the construction of a tower or a monopole must further
establish that the proposed site is particularly suitable for the intended use. See id. For the negative criteria, the court continued, local radiation concerns are not legitimate if the applicant complies
with federal regulations. See id. In addition, the supreme court professed, declines in property values must be supported by qualified
expert testimony. See id
Disputes between municipalities and telecommunication industries are widespread since the passage of the Telecommunications
Act in 1996. This is the first case in which the Supreme Court of
New Jersey attempted to resolve such a dispute; in so doing, the
court recognized that state and local laws regarding the regulation of
the telecommunications industry have been preempted by federal
legislation. The court consciously preserved what is left for local
regulations and yet did not frustrate the purposes of the federal statute. The court was successful in this exercise.
First, in refusing to recognize Smart as a public utility company,
the court prohibited Smart from being exempt from the height restriction in the municipal ordinance. Smart must then satisfy the
positive and negative criteria under the local rules for a land use
variance. Thus, the supreme court allowed municipalities to retain
their rights to examine such applications for land use variances.
Similar to the issue of public utility status, the supreme court recognized that telecommunications facilities are inherently beneficial but
refused to grant them such status as of right. Instead, the court
placed the burden on telecommunications companies to establish
that their proposed sites are particularly suitable for their intended
uses. This leaves room for the municipalities to impose exhaustion
requirements, requiring telecommunications companies to exhaust
the possibility of using existing facilities. It is only after this requirement is satisfied that municipalities will concede that proposed
new sites are particularly suitable.
Therefore, the court was successful in preserving control for local municipalities. The court's decision should be praised as a sensible compromise in light of the conflicts between local concerns and
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the federal mandate. The decision, however, will not end this particular wave of litigation. If existing sites are already owned by other
telecommunications companies, owners may be unwilling to lease
space to competitors. Aware of this conflict, some landlords are applying for approval to build towers or monopoles on their lands
while keeping an eye on the multiple rental income derived from
renting space to telecommunications companies. As a result, municipalities will likely face more applications and more litigation.
Sooner or later, as the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized, some
bright line rules will be required. The court, however, may be right
in first testing this compromise approach before taking the next
step.
Tony Lam
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CIVIL PROCEDURE-Entire Controversy Doctrine-Child Custody
Actions Are Not Exempt from the Entire Controversy Doctrine and
Tort Claims Arising from Facts Relevant to the Custody Action
Should Be Raised in the Original Proceeding-Oliver v. Ambrose, 152
N.J. 383, 705 A.2d 742 (1998).
Plaintiff Beverly Oliver and defendant Louis Ambrose were involved in an eight-year relationship marked by violence and repeated
periods of separation. See Oliver v. Ambrose, 152 NJ. 383, 386, 705
A.2d 742, 743 (1998). Oliver first met Ambrose, a coworker in
AT&T's accounting department, in January 1980. What began as a
friendship evolved into a more intimate relationship on July 1, 1981,
when Ambrose visited Oliver in the hospital after she was involved in
a car accident.
Oliver ended this relationship for the first time in October 1982
when she met another man. See id. at 387, 705 A.2d at 743. In February 1983, however, Ambrose and Oliver resumed their relationship. In April 1983, Oliver discovered that she was pregnant and informed Ambrose. He reacted violently-slapping her in the face,
choking her, and pushing her against a wall-and demanded that
she have an abortion. Oliver had the abortion a few days after informing Ambrose of her pregnancy.
In December 1983, Oliver became pregnant again. When she
informed Ambrose of this pregnancy, he allegedly threatened to take
her life if she refused to have an abortion. At this point, Oliver terminated the relationship for a second time.
In September 1984, however, Oliver and Ambrose reconciled.
In December of that year, Oliver became pregnant again. In response to her refusal to have another abortion, Ambrose allegedly
attempted to run the plaintiff over with his car, threatened to kill
her, tied her to the refrigerator, and threw her down a flight of
basement stairs and locked the door. After these events, Oliver
awoke in the middle of the night and discovered that she had miscarried.
According to Ambrose, however, the events of that day were
quite different. Ambrose claimed that there was no conflict until after the miscarriage and that the argument was unrelated to Oliver's
pregnancy. See id., 705 A.2d at 743-44. Ambrose asserted that when
he tried to drive away Oliver threw herself on the hood of the car to
stop him from leaving. See id., 705 A.2d at 744. As to locking Oliver
in the basement, Ambrose claimed that he went to retrieve his
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clothes from the basement, and that after she followed him down
the stairs he ran upstairs and then locked the door. Ambrose terminated the relationship after this incident but the two later reconciled.
In October 1985, Oliver became pregnant again and informed
Ambrose. See id. at 388, 705 A.2d 744. Again, she alleged that Ambrose responded violently and that after the violent episode she miscarried. Ambrose, on the other hand, claimed not to have seen Oliver until after the miscarriage. Oliver ended the relationship again
only to reconcile with Ambrose in May 1986. In January 1988, Oliver
informed the defendant that she was expecting a child for the fifth
time. Ambrose demanded that she have an abortion or place the
child up for adoption. According to Oliver, Ambrose assaulted her
after she insisted on giving birth.
OnJuly 9, 1988, Oliver gave birth to a baby girl. Shortly thereafter she became engaged to Bruce Oliver. The plaintiff alleged that
when she told the defendant of her engagement he told her that she
would be forced to kill him in order to keep him away. Ambrose, on
the other hand, alleged that he attempted to visit his daughter several times but was denied.
The day after her marriage to Bruce Oliver, the plaintiff filed a
harassment claim against the defendant in municipal court. See id
About a month and a half later, Ambrose filed a complaint seeking
joint custody of his daughter and a determination of support. See id.
Oliver then filed a response to this complaint that delineated the
abortions and allegations of abuse. See id. at 389, 705 A.2d at 744.
Oliver's answer to the complaint did not, however, raise any affirmative claims or counterclaims. See id., 705 A.2d at 745. The parties
subsequently settled this action and, as a result of the settlement, the
harassment claim against Ambrose was dismissed. See id. at 390, 705
A.2d at 745.
Within four months of the settlement agreement, Oliver and
her husband commenced a tort action against Ambrose. See id. The
alleged abuse that occurred between 1981 and 1988 served as the
foundation for this suit. See id. In September 1993, nearly four years
after the commencement of the suit, Ambrose moved for summary
judgment citing the running of the statute of limitations and the entire controversy doctrine. See id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, found that all
claims based upon acts occurring before December 26, 1987, were
barred by the statute of limitations and that the remaining claims,
which should have been raised in the custody action, were barred by
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the entire controversy doctrine. See id. at 390-91, 705 A.2d at 745.
The trial court found that the tort claims were purposefully withheld
pending the outcome of the settlement negotiations in the custody
suit. See id. at 391, 705 A.2d at 745. The Olivers subsequently appealed. See id.
The NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the
decision of the trial court in an unpublished opinion. See id. A majority of the appellate court noted that the central question was
whether the "'claims [arose] from related facts of the same transaction or series of transactions.'" Id., 705 A.2d at 745-46 (citation omitted). The court concluded that the tort claims concerned the same
set of facts that were relevant to the child custody action. See id.
Therefore, the appellate court held that the tort claims should have
been raised in the custody action. See id.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the decision of the
appellate division pursuant to Rule 2:2-1 to address the issue raised
by the dissenting opinion. See id. at 391-92, 705 A.2d at 746. Given
the limited nature of review under this rule, the court confined its
discussion to the issue of whether the entire controversy doctrine
applies to child custody actions. See id. The supreme court held that
the entire controversy doctrine has no exemption for child custody
actions. See id. at 392, 705 A.2d at 746.
Justice Garibaldi, writing for a six member majority, began the
opinion by outlining the history of the entire controversy doctrine.
See id. The justice noted that the doctrine began as an equitable
common-law rule that prevented a single cause of action from being
divided into several claims. See id. This doctrine, the court stated,
became so firmly rooted that it was granted constitutional status in
1947. See id. The majority explained that adherence to the doctrine
was brought about by the need to prevent the delay and expense that
often accompanied duplicative litigation. See id. The court also expressed concern over preventing a party from holding a claim "in reserve" and noted that a party making use of this strategy is barred
from raising such claims in subsequent litigation. See id. at 393, 705
A.2d at 746-47.
The majority continued by observing that the entire controversy
doctrine governs nearly all causes of action, including family actions.
See id. at 394, 705 A.2d at 747. The court cited Brennan v. Orban as an
example. See id. (citing 145 N.J. 282, 290-91, 678 A.2d 667, 671-72
(1996)). In Brennan, the court noted, a subsequent tort action was
barred because the tort claim was not raised in a divorce proceeding
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encompassing the same set of facts. See id. at 395, 705 A.2d at 747
(citing 145 N.J. at 291, 678 A.2d at 672).
After reaffirming that the entire controversy doctrine governs
family actions, Justice Garibaldi addressed concerns of fairness. See
id., 705 A.2d at 748. Noting that the entire controversy doctrine remains an equitable doctrine, the justice stated that inquiry into the
facts of individual cases will ultimately govern a determination of the
doctrine's applicability. See id. As an example, the justice noted that
in Prevratilv. Mohr the court remanded the case to the trial court to
determine the applicability of the entire controversy doctrine and to
determine whether it was fair to dismiss the claims of a plaintiff
whose counsel in the first action was chosen for her by her insurance
company. See id. at 396, 705 A.2d at 748 (citing 145 N.J. 180, 196,
678 A.2d 243, 251 (1996)). In considering the issue of fairness to the
plaintiff, the majority stated that application of the doctrine is not
unfair when the plaintiff is sufficiently aware of the additional claim
at the time of the first suit. See id. The supreme court concluded the
discussion of the fairness issue by stressing that "[c]laims stemming
from the same core of facts should be raised in one action." Id. at
397, 705 A.2d at 748.
Applying the doctrine to the Olivers' case, the court noted that
the tort action involved the same set of facts raised in the child custody and harassment actions. See id., 705 A.2d at 748-49. The majority dispensed with the Olivers' argument-that the custody action focused on the child's best interest while the tort action focused solely
on Ambrose's actions-by stating that it was obvious that Ambrose's
abusive actions were relevant to the child custody proceeding. See id.
at 398, 705 A.2d at 749. Justice Garibaldi found the argument to be
especially weak given that Oliver included details of the abuse in her
response to Ambrose's custody action. See id. Thus, the justice
found that the entire controversy doctrine prevented the tort claims
from being brought in a second action. See id. at 399, 705 A.2d at
749. The majority explained that Oliver's failure to raise the tort
claims in the custody action was the product of trial strategy and in
direct conflict with the entire controversy doctrine's goal of preventing unnecessary delay. See id., 705 A.2d at 749, 750.
In addition, the court found that the operation of the doctrine
in this case would not be unfair to the plaintiffs. See id. at 401-02, 705
A.2d at 751. The majority began this fairness analysis by noting that
any possible unfairness to the plaintiffs was mitigated because the
majority of the claims against Ambrose was barred by the statute of
limitations. See id. at 399, 705 A.2d at 750. In response to the plain-
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tiffs' assertion that the time constraints of custody actions make
mandatory joinder unfair, Justice Garibaldi stated that the restraints
in custody actions were not so great as to be problematic. See id. at
400-01, 705 A.2d at 750. The justice distinguished custody actions
from cases brought under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act,
which requires a hearing within ten days of filing and is thereby excepted from the operation of the entire controversy doctrine. See id.
at 400, 705 A.2d at 750. The court stressed that, although joinder in
a given custody action may be unfair indeed, this decision rests
within the discretion of the trial court. See id. at 401, 705 A.2d at 750.
The majority noted that the entire controversy doctrine does not
mandate that tort actions be litigated together with child custody actions, but the court did find that the doctrine requires the claims to
be raised in the original action so that the trial court can determine
whether a second action is appropriate. See id., 705 A.2d at 751.
Justice Garibaldi next focused the discussion on fairness to the
defendant. See id. at 402, 705 A.2d at 751. The justice found that it
would be patently unfair to force a defendant to litigate issues he believed were resolved by an earlier settlement. See id. Thus, even
though the defendant's failure to raise timely the doctrine did not
comport with the court's desire for preventing delay, the majority
concluded that the entire controversy doctrine's concern for fairness
mandated the dismissal of the tort claims. See id. at 403, 705 A.2d at
751.
Justice Stein, the sole dissenter, criticized the majority for continuing a "fixation" on the entire controversy doctrine. See id., 705
A.2d at 752 (Stein,J., dissenting). The justice particularly feared that
the application of the doctrine in this case would allow the perpetrator of serious alleged assaults to escape liability. See id. (Stein, J., dissenting). Given that Ambrose had not raised the issue of the entire
controversy doctrine until after nearly three years had passed, Justice
Stein would have found that the defendant had waived his right to
assert the doctrine. See id. at 403, 404, 705 A.2d at 752 (Stein, J., dissenting).
The dissent proceeded by citing to the court's recent statement
that the entire controversy doctrine would no longer be applied in a
draconian manner and that the preclusion of a claim had always
been, and would remain, an uncommon remedy. See id. at 404, 705
A.2d at 752 (Stein, J., dissenting) (citing Olds v. DonneUy, 150 N.J.
424, 446, 696 A.2d 633, 644-45 (1997)). In addition, Justice Stein
emphasized the special considerations conferred upon victims of
domestic violence because of the public's interest in providing them
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a remedy. See id. at 405, 705 A.2d 752-53 (citing Brennan v. Orban,
145 NJ. at 304, 678 A.2d at 678) (Stein,J., dissenting).
In reaching the conclusion that the entire controversy doctrine
should not bar the Olivers' tort action, Justice Stein relied upon several factors. See id. at 406-11, 705 A.2d at 753-56 (Stein, J., dissenting). First, the justice noted that the original custody action required the expenditure of only minimal judicial resources. See id. at
406, 705 A.2d at 753 (Stein, J., dissenting). Second, the dissent argued that Ambrose waived his right to benefit from the doctrine by
not raising the issue for nearly three years. See id. at 408, 705 A.2d at
754 (Stein,J., dissenting). Third,Justice Stein asserted that the legislature had clearly directed the judiciary to ensure both immediate
and long-term remedies to the victims of domestic violence. See id. at
411, 705 A.2d at 756 (Stein, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent concluded that application of the entire controversy doctrine in this case
is inconsistent with both the desire to prevent delay and the equitable underpinnings of the doctrine. See id. at 411, 412, 705 A.2d at
756, 757 (Stein,J., dissenting).
Although the concerns raised by Justice Stein carry great weight,
the majority's affirmance of the appellate division was appropriate
given the limited question presented for appeal. The sole question
for review was whether the entire controversy doctrine should apply
to child custody actions. Given that the court has found the doctrine
applicable to family and divorce actions, the majority's decision to
apply the doctrine to a child custody action is sound. It is simply unfortunate, however, that a plaintiff such as Beverly Oliver is denied
the opportunity to prove the occurrence of acts of horrible abuse
and to seek recovery for her injuries and loss. Thus, the warnings of
Justice Stein should be heeded should the court have the opportunity to address a similar case outside of the restrictions of Rule 2:2-1.
James L McClammy
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EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION-Racial
Discrimination-A
Rational Factfinder Could Find that a Single Derogatory Racial Slur
Uttered by an Employee's Superior Amounts to Discriminatory
Conduct Severe Enough to Create a Hostile Work Environment and
Outrageous Enough to Set Forth a Cause of Action for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress-Taylor v. Metzger, No. A-9, 1998 WL
63084 (N.J. Feb. 18, 1998).
On January 31, 1992, plaintiff Carrie Taylor, an AfricanAmerican woman who worked as a Burlington County Sheriff's Officer since 1972, encountered the defendant, Sheriff Henry Metzger,
while receiving firearms training at the Burlington County Police
Academy. See Taylor v. Metzger, No. A-9, 1998 WL 63084, at *1 (NJ.
Feb. 18, 1998). When Taylor greeted Metzger and Undersheriff Gerald Isham on that day, Metzger turned to Isham in response and
commented, "'There's the jungle bunny.'" Taylor, extremely upset
by what she perceived to be a derogatory and demeaning racial
comment, immediately began to cry but could not otherwise respond. Rather, she removed herself from Metzger's presence and
went to the lavatory. Still emotional from the incident, Taylor returned to the Police Academy classroom, where she was the only
woman and the only African American, and recounted her experience to fellow classmates. Her classmates proceeded to laugh and
one even mocked her. See id. at *1, *8.
After consulting her union attorney, Taylor met with Metzger
on February 5, 1992, to discuss the incident and to request a written
apology. Claiming that he did not know the term was offensive,
Metzger harassed Taylor for perceiving the phrase as a racial slur to
the point that Taylor was again brought to tears. Only after Undersheriff Davis agreed that the comment was indeed offensive did
Metzger consider apologizing. At a second meeting the following
day, Metzger offered Taylor a written apology, however, the apology
incorrectly stated that Taylor was wearing camouflage pants on the
day in question. See id. at *2. Therefore, Taylor rejected the apology.
Metzger proceeded to badger Taylor for refusing the apology. Finally, in a third meeting on February 10, Metzger offered another
written mea culpa, but Taylor wanted to consult an attorney before
accepting the apology.
After disclosing details of her experience to the media, Taylor
began receiving threatening and harassing telephone calls. As a result of the calls, Taylor filed a police report and changed her phone

1420

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 28:1394

number. In addition, she received one threatening letter and subsequently purchased a bullet-proof vest. Taylor was removed from the
position of floor supervisor after the incident, but was told this was
because only sergeants were eligible to fill that position. Aside from
this incident, Taylor did not lose income or her basic job duties. According to Taylor, however, her coworkers treated her coolly after
the incident with Metzger. She believed they were told not to interact with her because she was deemed a troublemaker. In addition,
Taylor stated that she suffered emotional distress manifested by
nervousness, fear of leaving work alone, fear of reprisal, nightmares,
insomnia, mood changes, and a psychiatric itch. Taylor's psychiatrist
labeled her condition as "'post-traumatic stress disorder'" and directly linked the disorder to the experience of being called a "jungle
bunny" by her employer. Although her psychiatrist recommended
further treatment, Taylor could not afford to continue therapy.
Taylor filed a complaint against Metzger, alleging that his
statement violated the Law Against Discrimination (LAD). See id. at
*1. The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, granted defendant's summary judgment motion on that claim. See id. In addition,
the trial court dismissed Taylor's claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, violations of federal civil rights acts, and prima
facie tort included in the complaint. See id.
The NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the
trial court's judgment in an unpublished opinion. See id. The Supreme Court of New Jersey subsequently granted Taylor's petition
for certification. See id
The NewJersey Supreme Court reversed the appellate division's
decision and remanded the case for trial. See id. at *18. The majority
held that based on the plaintiff's evidence, a rational factfinder
could find that the defendant's utterance of a single derogatory racial slur constituted discriminatory conduct sufficiently severe to create a hostile work environment in violation of the LAD and outrageous enough to state a cause of action for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress. See id at *9, *17.
Justice Handier, author of the majority opinion, began the
analysis by addressing the issue of whether Metzger's comment violated the LAD. See id. at *3. Specifically, the justice stated that discrimination based on race is prohibited under the LAD. See id The
court further explained that to succeed under the LAD a plaintiff
must demonstrate that, (1) but for the plaintiff's race, the defendant
would not have made a comment (2) so severe or pervasive (3) such
that a reasonable person in the plaintiffs situation would believe (4)
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that the conduct altered the working conditions and created a hostile work environment. See id, (citing Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132
N.J. 587, 603-04, 626 A.2d 445, 454 (1993)).
The majority next noted that, instead of adopting a regular and
pervasive test, Lehmann adopted the severe or pervasive test, which
does not necessarily require repetitive or recurrent acts of harassment to establish a hostile work environment. See id. Therefore,Justice Handler emphasized that under certain circumstances the single
utterance of a racial slur may be sufficient to establish a hostile work
environment. See id. The justice recognized, however, that only in a
rare and extreme circumstance will a single incident of harassing
conduct be sufficiently severe to establish a prima facie case. See id
(citing Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 606-07, 626 A.2d at 455).
In determining whether a racial slur is sufficiently severe to establish a hostile work environment, the supreme court stressed that a
racial slur's connotation may be a determinative or at least a critical
factor. See id at *5. The majority observed that in the present case
the term "jungle bunny" is a racist and derogatory slur that sends an
"unambiguously demeaning racial message" to the individual who is
the subject of the remark. See id. Indeed, Justice Handier commented that this phrase, in and of itself, is sufficient to contaminate
the work environment. See id.
Furthermore, Justice Handler noted that the severity of the racial slur was compounded because Taylor's supervisor, a superior officer, uttered the remark. See id. at *6. In particular, the justice explained that a supervisor has a duty to ensure that harassment in the
workplace is avoided, prevented, and rectified. See id, The majority
emphasized that in the instant case, not only did Metzger not fulfill
this duty, he initiated the harassing conduct. See id Moreover, Justice Handler continued by noting that, because the offender was also
the plaintiff's superior, Taylor had no avenue of redress. See id. at *7.
For example, the court pointed out that, when Taylor did confront
Metzger, he rebuked her. See id. Given these circumstances and the
racial slur's connotation, the court concluded that the single utterance of the phrase may have been sufficiently severe to produce a
hostile work environment. See id. at *5.
Next, the supreme court observed that to set forth an LAD
claim based on racial discrimination the plaintiff does not necessarily
have to establish that the working conditions were actually altered.
See id. at *8. Rather, the majority stressed that the circumstances surrounding the incident must be examined to determine whether a
single racial slur was sufficiently severe to establish a cause of action
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for hostile work environment. See id Furthermore, Justice Handler
explained that under the LAD the test for severity is viewed from the
point of view of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's circumstance.
See id. at *7 (citing Lehmann, 132 NJ. at 603-04, 626 A.2d at 453).
The justice noted that in the context of this case the reasonable person standard is the reasonable African American. See id.
Subsequently, the majority determined that a rational factfinder
could find that a reasonable African American may believe that,
when a supervisor utters a racial slur in the presence of another superior officer, the supervisor not only devalues the employee as a
person but thinks the employee is inferior to the other employees
due to her race. See id. Moreover, the court elaborated that a reasonable African American could find that such conduct by a supervisor creates an attitude of prejudice and hostility that permeates the
workplace and produces a hostile environment. See id. In sum, Justice Handler concluded that, based on the particular circumstances
of the case, the single derogatory racial slur was sufficiently severe to
allege a degree of harassment capable of altering the working conditions and thereby creating a hostile work environment. See id. at *8.
AlthoughJustice Handler recognized that other courts require a
plaintiff to show specific evidence of altered working conditions, the
majority rejected the notion that such proof is a prerequisite to finding the conduct sufficiently severe. See id. Nonetheless, the justice
emphasized that Taylor's work environment was indeed altered. See
id. The court specifically pointed out that prior to the alleged incident Taylor had never encountered racial slurs at the workplace;
however, the incident with Metzger altered that work environment.
See id. For example, the court recounted that Metzger made the degrading remark in the presence of one other supervisor. See id. In
addition, the court explained that, when Taylor told her coworkers
about the experience, they laughed and ridiculed her. See id. The
majority further reiterated that, when Taylor attempted to confront
Metzger, not only did he refuse to apologize to her, but he badgered
her for perceiving the comment as a racial slur. See id. Additionally,
Justice Handier noted that Taylor's coworkers treated her differently
after the incident and labeled her a troublemaker. See id. Consequently, the justice determined that based on this evidence a rational
factfinder could find that the single incident altered Taylor's working conditions. See id
Recognizing that the goal of the LAD is to eradicate discrimination, the majority concluded that Taylor presented sufficient evidence to survive a summary judgment motion. See id. at *9. In par-
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ticular, Justice Handler noted that, because a reasonable factfinder
could find that Metzger's single utterance of a racial slur amounted
to discriminatory harassment sufficiently severe to create a hostile
work environment, Taylor's LAD claim survived the defendant's motion for summaryjudgment. See id.
Turning to the issue of whether Metzger's comment was sufficient to set forth a cause of action for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress, Justice Handler first examined the elements of
the tort. See id. The justice explained that a plaintiff must set forth
evidence demonstrating that the alleged conduct was (1) intentional
and outrageous and (2) the proximate cause of (3) severe distress.
See id. (citing Buckley v. Trenton Say. Fund Soc'y, 111 N.J. 355, 366, 544
A.2d 857, 863 (1988)). Specifically, the majority emphasized that, to
state a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the conduct must be so outrageous and extreme as to extend
beyond all bounds of decency and be regarded as intolerable and
atrocious by a civilized society. See id. (citing Buckley, 111 N.J. at 366,
544 A.2d at 863).
In determining that Metzger's remark was sufficiently outrageous, the majority reasoned that a rational factfinder could find
that a supervisor's single utterance of a racial slur to a subordinate
constitutes atrocious and intolerable conduct in a civilized society.'
See id. Moreover, Justice Handler stated that a rational factfinder
could determine that Metzger's choice of the phrase "jungle bunny"
went beyond all bounds of decency. See id. Although the justice acknowledged that other courts have refused to find, as a matter of law,
the single use of a racial slur sufficient to state a cause of action for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the majority rejected
those cases. See id. at *10. In light of the state's strong public policy
against harassing discrimination, the majority refused to find a degrading racial slur directed at a subordinate by her superior to be a
mere "picayune insult." See id. To buttress this viewpoint, Justice
Handler reminded the court that racial slurs are explicitly linked to
the country's history of slavery and as such are extremely degrading
to the victim. See id.
The majority limited its finding, however, by explaining that not
every racial slur uttered on the street by a stranger would be found
sufficiently outrageous and extreme to state a cause of action for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at *11. Rather,
the court emphasized that, when the racial slur is uttered in the
workplace to a subordinate by a supervisor who has a duty to prevent
invidious discrimination, "the power dynamics of the workplace con-
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tribute to the extremity and outrageousness of defendant's conduct."
Id. Therefore, Justice Handler stressed that, because the employer/employee relationship is special, it must be examined as a
factor when determining liability. See id.
Applying the law to the facts at hand, the majority concluded
that, because Metzger was not only Taylor's superior officer but "the
second highest-ranking law enforcement official in the county," the
power dynamics of the employer/employee relationship supported a
finding of outrageous conduct. I&t Hence, Justice Handler determined that, although Metzger only uttered the ugly racial slur once,
a rational factfinder could decide that Metzger's conduct was sufficiently outrageous and extreme given the unusual circumstances
surrounding the incident. See id. On the other hand, the justice also
recognized that a jury could reasonably find otherwise because
Metzger claimed he did not comprehend the offensiveness of the
comment and provided a written apology. See id at *12. In sum, the
court concluded that based on the plaintiff's evidence the defendant
was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of outrageousness. See id.
The court next examined whether Metzger's conduct was intentional. See id&Justice Handler stated that Metzger undoubtedly intended to make the comment given that he stated, "'There's the
jungle bunny.'" See id Furthermore, the justice determined that a
jury could reasonably reject Metzger's claim that he did not appreciate the offensiveness of the remark and could further find that
Metzger chose that phrase to inflict emotional distress. See id, The
majority concluded that because the issue of Metzger's intent is a
disputed fact the court could not determine the issue as matter of
law. See id.
Next, the court examined whether the emotional distress allegedly suffered by Taylor could be found so severe to the point that it
could not be endured by a reasonable person. See id. The majority
noted that complaints alleging that a plaintiff suffered from aggravation, embarrassment, and headaches have been held insufficient. See
id. at *13 (citing Buck/ey, 111 NJ. at 368, 544 A.2d at 864). In contrast, Justice Handler highlighted that Taylor's evidence demonstrated that she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, a psychological disorder for which she sought medical treatment. See id.
The justice explained that the disorder manifested itself in symptoms such as anxiety, fear, insomnia, and nightmares that continued
for over two years following the incident. See id. at *12. In addition,
the medical evidence linked the disorder directly to Metzger's con-
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duct. See i& at *13. Therefore, based on the evidence, the court determined that a jury could reasonably find that Taylor suffered from
severe emotional distress. See id.
In addition to subjectively causing Taylor harm, Justice Handler
explained that the evidence must prove that an average person
would have suffered severe mental harm. See id The justice elaborated that this objective standard is necessary to prevent plaintiffs
with "idiosyncratic emotional distress" from recovering when an average person would not have been harmed by the alleged conduct.
See id. Nevertheless, the court cautioned that the average person
under the objective standard must be similarly situated to the position of the plaintiff. See id. at *14. When the claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress is based on racial discrimination and the plaintiff is black, the majority stated that the average
person standard is defined as the average African American. See id.
Justice Handler explained that this standard is appropriate because,
similar to the reasonable woman standard employed in LAD claims
for the purpose of overcoming the male-biased reasonable person
standard, African Americans may react differently to racial remarks
than white people. See id. The justice observed that this was particularly the case in certain sectors of the workforce in which African
Americans may represent a minority. See id.
Applying the average African American standard, the court determined that, given the particular circumstances of the case, a jury
could reasonably find that Metzger's conduct would have seriously
devastating emotional effects on the average African American. See
id&at *15. Justice Handler reiterated that (1) the remark was made
by a supervisor in the presence of another supervisor, (2) Taylor was
the only African American in her workplace, and (3) Taylor had
never before experienced racial slurs at work. See id. The justice
stressed that it was apparent following the incident that Metzger did
not think of Taylor as a capable employer, or even as a valued human
being, but rather as "nothing more than a 'jungle bunny.'" Id. Indeed, the justice found that a rational factfinder could decide that
this single comment uttered by a supervisor in the workplace would
cause the average African American severe emotional distress. See id.
Consequently, the majority concluded that the issue of whether the
conduct was objectively severe enough to cause emotional distress
could not be determined as a matter of law. See id. at *16. In sum,
the court held that based on the evidence the claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress withstood a summary judgment
motion. Seeid. at *17.
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Lastly, the majority affirmed the appellate court's dismissal of
Taylor's prima facie tort claim, which permits a cause of action for
intentionally inflicting injury that does not fall under other traditional forms of liability. See i& (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 870 (1979)). AlthoughJustice Handler acknowledged that several
states have recognized a cause of action for prima facie tort, the supreme court declined to do so in the present case. See id. Specifically, the justice noted that the prima facie tort would be encompassed in Taylor's intentional infliction of emotional distress and
LAD claims. See id. Therefore, because a prima facie tort claim is
generally available only when no other form of liability exists the
court declined to recognize the cause of action in the present case.
See id.
Justice Garibaldi wrote a separate opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part. See id. at *18 (Garibaldi,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The justice agreed with the majority's dismissal of Taylor's prima facie tort claim. See id. at *18, *23
(Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Garibaldi disagreed, however, with the majority's decision to reverse
the dismissal of Taylor's LAD and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims. See id at *18 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Justice Garibaldi first analyzed the plaintiff's LAD claim. See id.
The justice agreed with the majority on several issues, including applying the Lehmann standard to racial discrimination cases, finding
that a single racial slur may be so severe as to create a hostile work
environment; the justice also considered Metzger's position as Sheriff to be a relevant factor. See id. Nevertheless, the justice disagreed
with the majority that the incident in this case, objectively viewed,
produced a hostile work environment. See id. In particular, after reviewing Metzger's conduct, Justice Garibaldi concluded that, because
the degrading racial slur was uttered only once, the incident never
happened again, and Metzger eventually apologized, a reasonable
woman would not find the comment so severe as to create a hostile
work environment. See id.
Furthermore, Justice Garibaldi determined that the majority's
opinion was incorrect because Taylor provided no proof that her
working conditions were altered as a result of the incident. See id. at
*19 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Rather, the justice observed that the evidence demonstrated that
Taylor remained in the office, did not miss work, and continued to
perform well. See id. The justice criticized the majority for expand-
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ing the scope of LAD claims, because "'the hostile work environment
is the legally recognized harm.'" Id. (citing Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 610,
626 A.2d at 457). In addition, the justice warned that because the
majority's perception of a single racial slur differs from that used in
defamation cases, in which comments of racism or bigotry do not
constitute actionable defamation, the majority's holding could result
in a chilling effect on individual freedom of speech. See id. In sum,
Justice Garibaldi determined that Taylor lacked sufficient evidence
to survive a summary judgment motion on her LAD claim. See id. at
*20, *23 (Garibaldi,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Next, Justice Garibaldi turned to the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim. See id. at *20 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The justice stated that even if Taylor
could prove her LAD claim it does not necessarily follow that every
incident of discrimination results in the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See id. Reviewing the decisions of other jurisdictions, the justice pointed out that many courts have held a single racial epithet uttered by the plaintiffs superior not sufficiently outrageous to state a cause of action for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See id, Similarly, Justice Garibaldi determined
that, when objectively viewed, the evidence did not prove that Taylor
suffered physical illness or psychological harm nor did it prove that
an average African American would have suffered such harm. See id.
at *21, *22 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In conclusion, the justice refused to allow a claim for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress to go forward when, as a matter of
law, there was no sufficient proof of severe emotional distress. See id.
at *23 (Garibaldi,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The majority's decision symbolizes the very goal of the LAD-to
end invidious forms of harassing discrimination that plague our
modern society. Harassing discrimination in the workplace raises
significant problems because the discrimination permeates an environment in which the victim must spend a substantial amount of
time to earn a living. Moreover, racial discrimination in the workplace is particularly degrading and demoralizing because it sends a
message to the victim that, because of her race, she is a less valuable
employee. The number of words used or the amount of times repeated should not be the litmus test for determining whether racial
discrimination existed in the workplace. A single racist slur can have
the potentially devastating impact of depriving an individual of her
self respect and dignity by implying to the workforce that certain
races are inferior. Therefore, a victim who suffers such discrimination at the hands of her supervisor in front of another supervisor
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should not be denied redress in a court of law, particularly when all
other avenues of redress have been blocked.
Given that the LAD is a remedial statute, it should be liberally
construed. Although other jurisdictions have limited recovery for a
single racial epithet uttered by a supervisor, the majority's decision
reinforced the remedial goal of the LAD, particularly in the workplace. At the same time, the majority astutely limited its holding to
the very particular and egregious facts of the case. Regardless of
whether the justices agree or disagree on the ultimate issue of liability, because the LAD is a remedial statute and reasonable minds
could disagree on the severity of the conduct, the majority correctly
held that Taylor's LAD claim should not be decided as a matter of
law.
Justice Garibaldi would dismiss the plaintiff's cause of action for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress because the justice
does not believe that Taylor subjectively or objectively suffered a severe emotional distress. Taylor was assaulted by a particularly ugly
and degrading racial slur that carried a clear message of racism.
Moreover, the circumstances surrounding that assault make the incident even more egregious: her supervisor degraded her in front of
another supervisor, he badgered her when she bravely attempted to
redress the situation, and he further insulted her by offering an
apology consisting of a lie to cover-up the severity of the comment.
Based on this evidence, to tell the plaintiff that she did not suffer
sufficient emotional distress to present her case to ajury would only
have added insult to injury. Furthermore, for a court to determine
"objectively" as a matter of law the level of emotional distress the average African American would have suffered in this situation is ludicrous. Ajury of Taylor's peers is the correct body to determine what
harm the average African American in Taylor's situation would have
suffered, not seven highly educated justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court.
KaraMcCarthy Perry
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CRIMINAL LAW-Plea Agreements-Attorney General's Plea
Agreement Guidelines Pursuant to Section 12 of the Comprehensive
Drug Reform Act of 1987 Violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine
and Fail to Meet Statutory Goals of Uniformity in Sentencing,
Requiring the Court to Order the Attorney General to Promulgate
New Uniform Plea Guidelines to be Imposed on All Counties
Statewide-State v. Brimag No. A-34, 1998 WL 65573 (N.J. Feb. 19,
1998).
Pursuant to a search warrant, the Franklin Township Police
conducted a search of defendant Christopher Brimage's residence
on May 12, 1995. See State v. Brimag No. A-34, 1998 WL 65573, at *2
(N.J. Feb. 19, 1998). During the search, Brimage turned over six
grams of cocaine contained in eighteen bags. The police arrested
Brimage and several other persons present in the house. Brimage's
residence was located within 1000 feet of a high school. At his plea
hearing, Brimage revealed that he bought the cocaine with the intention of reselling the drugs in Franklin Township.
The State indicted Brimage in September 1995 under the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987 (CDRA). See id. at *1, *2 (citing
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-1 to § 36A-1 (West 1987)). The State charged
Brimage with several third degree offenses under the CDRA, including (1) possessing, with intent to distribute, a controlled dangerous
substance, (2) possessing, with intent to distribute, a controlled dangerous substance within 1000 feet of a school, and (3) possessing a
controlled dangerous substance. See id. at *2. The presentence report revealed that Brimage was twenty years old when he was arrested
and living with his mother, siblings, and grandparents at the grandparents' residence. Brimage had three earlier juvenile adjudications,
the most recent when he was fourteen, but he had never previously
been charged with an indictable offense.
In exchange for Brimage's guilty plea, the Somerset County
prosecutor's office agreed to seek the presumptive sentence for third
degree school zone offenses. The presumptive sentence would require Brimage to serve four years in jail, with a mandatory period of
parole ineligibility for three years. The prosecutor's office refused to
waive the parole ineligibility term because it was fully prepared to
litigate the case, the defendant refused to cooperate in other investigations, and the office had strong evidence against Brimage, including a taped confession.
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Brimage made a discovery request to the State for a copy of the
written guidelines adopted by Somerset County for plea offers for
school zone offenses. The State responded that Somerset County
had adopted the Attorney General's Guidelines (Guidelines) instead
of drafting its own guidelines. The State contended that Somerset
County's adoption of the Guidelines satisfied the county's requirement to adopt a written policy on plea agreements. Based on the
State's response, the trial court dismissed Brimage's discovery request as moot. Brimage subsequently agreed to the prosecutor's
original plea offer. Brimage pled guilty to every count but reserved
the right to attack the legitimacy of the Guidelines and the mandatory parole ineligibility as applied to his case.
The trial court held a hearing in March 1996 on the defendant's
motion to waive the mandatory minimum sentence. See id. at *3.
First, Brimage contended that under the Attorney General's Guidelines the standard plea offer for school zone crimes was probation
conditioned on serving 364 days in a countyjail. Brimage contended
that the prosecutor's decision not to make this offer was arbitrary
and capricious. Second, Brimage argued that the disparity in the
various counties' standard plea offers under the Guidelines was insupportable. In response, the State asserted that even under the
Guidelines the standard plea offer included the mandatory threeyear period of parole ineligibility. The State also argued that statewide uniformity in plea offers was not mandatory.
The NewJersey Superior Court, Law Division, denied Brimage's
motion. See id. The court held that the minimum offer under the
Guidelines applied only when the prosecutor exercised his discretion
to waive the parole ineligibility period. See id. The court explained
that the prosecutor exercised no such discretion in this case because
the county had a standard policy of refusing to waive the parole ineligibility period in school zone cases. See id. The trial court also
held a sentencing hearing in conjunction with the hearing on
Brimage's motion. See id. The court found that negative influences
from Brimage's older family members constituted one mitigating
factor in favor of the defendant. See id. The court, however, also
found four aggravating factors weighing against Brimage: (1) the
risk that he would continue to commit crimes, (2) his prior criminal
activity as a juvenile, (3) the need for deterrence of Brimage and
other drug dealers, and (4) the mere imposition of a fine without a
corresponding jail sentence would be perceived by drug dealers as
nothing more than the cost of doing business in the drug trade. See
id. The trial court accepted the prosecutor's recommendation and
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sentenced Brimage to four years ofjail time, with no parole eligibility
for three years. See id.
An Excessive Sentencing Panel of the New Jersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division, affirmed Brimage's sentence. See id. The
panel held that the sentence did not constitute an abuse of discretion and was not unduly excessive or punitive. See id. The panel,
however, failed to address the issue of statewide disparity in plea bargaining guidelines.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and reversed the appellate division. See id. at *3, *15. The court held that
Brimage's sentence must be vacated because of the disparity of plea
offer policies among the various counties. See id. at *15. In addition,
the court ordered the Attorney General to promulgate new plea offer Guidelines within ninety days and to apply them uniformly to all
counties statewide. See id. at *14. The supreme court commanded
the Attorney General to eliminate any provisions that encourage disparities among the counties. See id. Furthermore, the court advised
the Attorney General to provide a range of permissible plea offers
for specific crimes and to draft explicit permissible bases for granting
downward and upward departures. See id. The court, however, held
that the Attorney General may continue to allow the various counties
flexibility in framing plea offers based upon county resources and
the individual circumstances of the defendant and the crime. See id.
Lastly, to promote effective judicial review, the supreme court required all prosecutors to state on the record their reasons for waiving
the mandatory parole ineligibility period or for departing from the
Guidelines. See id. The court pronounced that its ruling was prospective but made an exception for Brimage and any other defendants with cases on direct appeal. See id. In vacating Brimage's sentence, the court indicated that Brimage could choose either to vacate
his plea or to renegotiate it using the Guidelines as they stood when
he was initially sentenced. See id. at *15.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Garibaldi first analyzed
the CDRA. See id. at *3. The justice explained that section 7 of the
CDRA requires defendants to serve at least one-third to one-half of
their imposed sentence, but requires defendants convicted of distributing drugs or possessing drugs with intent to distribute in a
school zone to serve a minimum of three years. See id. The court
noted that section 7's mandatory minimum custodial sentence comports with the legislature's intent to make the CDRA a powerful
weapon in the war on drugs. See id.
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The court, however, highlighted the seeming inconsistency between section 7's nondiscretionary parole ineligibility period and
section 12's allowance for prosecutorial and judicial discretion in
waiving the period of parole ineligibility. See id. at *4. Justice Garibaldi explained that section 12's waiver provision was designed primarily to give defendants an incentive to cooperate and assist law enforcement agencies in other investigations. See id. The justice noted
that section 12 was also designed to encourage plea bargains to
lessen the burden on the judicial system. See id. Furthermore, the
supreme court recognized that section 12 gives prosecutors unique
sentencing powers by requiring courts to enforce all plea agreements
and by preventing courts from imposing shorter jail terms than
specified in the agreement. See id. The court acknowledged that this
shift of sentencing power to prosecutors has triggered many constitutional challenges to section 12 for violating the separation of powers doctrine. See id. at *5.
Justice Garibaldi observed that the court first upheld the constitutionality of section 12 in State v. Vasquez. See id. (citing 129 N.J.
189, 197, 609 A.2d 29, 33 (1992)). The justice explained that in
Vasquez the court required prosecutors to state on the record their
reasons for waiving, or refusing to waive, the parole ineligibility period and ordered prosecutors to develop written guidelines for exercising this discretion. See id. (citing 129 N.J. at 195-96, 609 A.2d at
32-33). The court portrayed the holding in Vasquez as an attempt to
aid courts in reviewing prosecutors' decisions for arbitrary and capricious behavior. See id.
The supreme court then discussed several pre-Vasquez decisions
in which the court allowed prosecutors to exercise greater discretion
in sentencing but only by conditioning this discretion on greater judicial review and requiring written guidelines from prosecutors. See
id at *5, *6 (citing State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992);
State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976); Monks v. State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971)). The court acknowledged
that the decisions in these cases reflect a desire to ensure uniformity
in sentencing. See id. at *6. The court posited that the use of uniform written guidelines coupled with judicial review will promote
greater uniformity in sentencing and assure that the separation of
powers is respected. See id. at *7.
Next, Justice Garibaldi discussed the Attorney General's Guidelines for plea agreements under the CDRA. See id. The justice explained that the Guidelines were promulgated to provide uniformity
in sentences and that section 12 was specifically designed to give de-
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fendants incentives to cooperate with law enforcement agencies. See
id. The court noted that the Guidelines instructed prosecutors to be
cautious in waiving mandatory prison sentences and periods of parole ineligibility. See id. The supreme court acknowledged that the
Guidelines suggested specific, mandatory prison terms for CDRA offenses, including three years of incarceration without parole eligibility for distributing or possessing with intent to distribute drugs on
school property, unless compelling circumstances justified a lesser
sentence. See id. Furthermore, the court reported that the Guidelines' minimum sentence for school zone offenses consisted of probation conditioned on serving 364 days in countyjail. See id.
The court acknowledged that, despite these clear pronouncements on mandatory sentences, the Guidelines also inexplicably directed the various county prosecutor offices to promulgate their own
written policies for reaching plea agreements. See id. at *8. Justice
Garibaldi emphasized that the Guidelines suggested that counties
consider such factors as the scope of the local drug problem, the
amount and type of drug-related arrests in the county, and any backlog in the county courts. See id. The justice explained that the
Guidelines also allowed counties to consider the circumstances surrounding the particular crime and defendant. See id. The court observed that by allowing the counties to devise their own local plea offer policies the Guidelines actually encouraged greater intercounty
disparity in sentencing for similar offenses. See id. Justice Garibaldi
then illustrated how the Guidelines resulted in actual differences
among the various counties in sentencing. See id.
Next, the supreme court reviewed the additional Guidelines
contained in the Attorney General's 1997 Supplemental Directive,
which was issued after Brimage entered his plea. See id. at *9. Justice
Garibaldi criticized this directive because it failed to rein in the discretion of local prosecutors that contributed to the intercounty disparity. See id. The justice explained that the Supplemental Directive
was issued pursuant to a requirement in the governor's drug enforcement program that required the Attorney General to issue new
guidelines regarding its charging, plea bargaining, and case disposition policies under the CDRA. See id. The court noted that the Supplemental Directive required the counties to develop written plea
policies, review these polices on an annual basis, prohibit downward
sentencing departures unless provided in the Guidelines, memorialize all plea agreements and sentencing departures in writing, seek all
appropriate driver's license suspensions and penalties allowed by
law, and permit offenders to be sentenced to treatment instead of
incarceration only if certain explicit conditions are met. See id. Jus-
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tice Garibaldi criticized the Supplemental Directive for continuing to
allow the various counties to develop their own plea agreement policies despite the directive's express intent to establish statewide uniformity in sentencing. See id. The justice complained that the Supplemental Directive, like the Guidelines, has contributed to actual
disparity in sentencing among the various counties. See id.
Next, Justice Garibaldi discussed the Attorney General's most
recent amendments to its plea agreement Guidelines, the Uniformity Directive. See id. at *9-10. Thejustice acknowledged that the Uniformity Directive was created in response to the court's mandate in
State v. Gems. See id. at *9 (citing 145 NJ. 216, 231-32, 678 A.2d 634,
642 (1996)). Thejustice explained that, in Gems, the supreme court
chose not to rule on the issue of intercounty sentencing disparity but
rather directed the Attorney General to review statewide sentencing
practices under the Guidelines and to report back to the court with
his results. See id.
Justice Garibaldi stated that the Uniformity Directive recognized
that the multitude of county plea agreement policies has resulted in
intercounty disparity in sentencing. See id. The justice stressed that
the directive specifically acknowledged that defendants charged with
third degree crimes in school zones are often sentenced to parole
ineligibility for eighteen months in some counties, while defendants
charged with the same crime in other counties are sentenced to probation conditioned upon 364 days of incarceration. See id. The
court explained that these sentences can be reduced to only ninety
days ofjail time in some counties because of early release polices and
parole laws. See id. The court further observed that the Uniformity
Directive concluded that it was not possible or desirable to obtain
statewide uniformity in plea agreement policies. See id. The supreme court stated that the directive sought to achieve greater uniformity by mandating a minimum plea offer. See id.
Justice Garibaldi next explained that the directive established a
minimum parole term of one year for school zone offenses, replacing the previous probation conditioned on serving 364 days of jail
time under the Guidelines. See id. at *11. The justice noted that the
directive retained this probation sentence for offenses involving less
than one ounce of marijuana, thereby replacing the ability of prosecutors to waive the prison sentence entirely under the Guidelines.
See id. The court further observed that the Uniformity Directive
merely raised the minimum plea offer for school zone offenses but
did nothing to eliminate disparity in the various counties' plea
agreement policies. See id.
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The court declared that uniformity in sentencing is one of the
foundations of the Code of Criminal Justice (Code). See id. Justice
Garibaldi posited that the legislature's intent in drafting the Code
was to give defendants notice of potential sentences for crimes and
to avoid arbitrary and excessive punishment. See id. The justice cited
to the court's earlier decisions in State v. Roth and State v. Hodge to
support the proposition that the Code's reforms were designed to
promote justice through greater uniformity and predictability in sentencing. See id. at *11-12 (citing 95 NJ. 334, 369, 471 A.2d 370, 389
(1984); 95 NJ. 369, 379, 471 A.2d 389, 395 (1984)).
Next, the court enunciated that to achieve uniformity the Code
provides specific guidelines, including mandatory minimum sentences, permissible ranges of sentences for various degrees of crimes,
presumed incarceration for first and second degree crimes, specific
mitigating and aggravating factors, guidelines for imposing mandatory extended terms, and a list of permissible sentencing dispositions. See id. at *12. The supreme court stressed that these guidelines are applicable on a statewide basis to ensure uniformity. See id.
Justice Garibaldi noted that the goal of uniformity in sentencing was
also of paramount concern to the legislature in drafting the CDRA.
See id.
Although Justice Garibaldi conceded that it is not possible to
achieve absolute uniformity in sentencing, the justice criticized the
Guidelines for failing to achieve a level of uniformity that is consistent with statutory goals. See id. at *13. Furthermore, the court cautioned that the Guidelines threaten the separation of powers between the prosecutor and the judiciary by failing to limit
prosecutorial discretion and encouraging arbitrary sentencing decisions. See id. The supreme court advised that prosecutors, like
judges, must have specific, uniform standards by which to exercise
discretion under the CDRA. See id. Although Justice Garibaldi acknowledged that prosecutors must still be allowed to consider county
resources and individual factors when deciding whether to waive a
mandatory sentence, the court required those factors to be specifically set forth in the Attorney General's new guidelines. See id.
Finally, Justice Garibaldi emphasized that the new guidelines
will meet both statutory requirements and the separation of powers
doctrine. See id. at *14. In addition, the justice asserted that the new
guidelines will satisfy a rational basis standard in any subsequent
challenge on equal protection grounds. See id. The court contended
that a rational basis exists for requiring uniform guidelines and for
allowing a limited degree of flexibility based on each county's re-
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sources. See id. The court further reasoned that public policy considerations prevent the retroactive application of this holding. See id.
First, Justice Garibaldi noted that the state, counties, and defendants
had all relied on the previous guidelines. See id. Second, the justice
found that retroactive application of the court's holding would place
an undue burden on the judicial system. See id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court correctly held that Brimage's
sentence must be vacated. The widespread disparity in sentencing
guidelines among the various counties denied defendants the opportunity to achieve equal treatment regardless of where their crimes
were committed. In addition, the old guidelines made plea agreements reached in some counties susceptible to challenges on equal
protection grounds. The reversal of the appellate division sends a
clear message that courts will not uphold plea agreements based on
the arbitrary exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
The court's directive to the Attorney General to promulgate
new guidelines provides an encouraging sign that the issue of intercounty disparity in plea agreements may finally be resolved. The
court, however, may be courting danger by continuing to allow counties to consider local resources when making plea offers to defendants. The retention of local discretion has proven to be an irritant
to the court in the past and has often provided the impetus for reform. The court cannot be faulted, however, for encouraging some
flexibility in the new guidelines. The Attorney General must now
thoughtfully and responsibly respond to the court's mandate and
draft new plea offer guidelines that will strike a proper balance between ensuring equal protection of the laws while continuing to allow proper local control over crime suppression.
BrianJ.Waters
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Fourth Amendment-Unreasonable
Search and Seizure Occurs During a Routine Traffic Stop Where a
Motorist is Transported to the Police Station in Handcuffs, is Told
By State Troopers that He is Not Free to Leave, and is Detained for
Almost Four Hours Prior to Arrest-State v. Dickey, 152 NJ. 468, 706
A.2d 180 (1998).
On the evening of February 12, 1994, defendant Theodore
Dickey was traveling on the New Jersey Turnpike in an automobile
driven by Dion Parker. See State v. Dickey, 152 NJ. 468, 472, 706 A-2d
180, 182 (1998). The New Jersey State Police stopped the car because it was traveling down the middle lane at twenty miles per hour
below the speed limit. Upon request of the state trooper, Parker
produced his license but provided neither proof of insurance nor
registration papers for the vehicle. Both Parker and Dickey indicated that the car belonged to "Leon," whose last name and address
they did not know. See id. at 473, 706 A.2d at 182. The trooper engaged in a quick search of the glove compartment for registration
and insurance documents but found none.
After refusing consent to search the rest of the vehicle, the
trooper asked Parker and Dickey to accompany him to the police
barracks for verification of the car's ownership. The trooper gave
Parker and Dickey their Miranda warnings, handcuffed them, and
placed them in the back seat of the police vehicle. They appeared to
be nervous and agitated, and Parker insisted that nothing was in the
trunk of his car. As a result of Parker's reference to the trunk, the
trooper decided to have the car towed back to the police barracks
and asked that a narcotics dog be brought to search the trunk.
Upon arrival at the police barracks, the trooper told Dickey and
Parker that they could not leave until the investigation was complete.
See id., 706 A.2d at 183. After running the license plates through a
computer search, the trooper found no indication that the automobile was stolen and further discovered that Leon McCullum was the
registered owner of the car. By two in the morning, however, the
narcotics detection dog signaled the presence of drugs in the car's
trunk. Almost four hours after the initial stop by the trooper, Dickey
finally signed a consent form that allowed troopers to search the car,.
The trooper's search of the trunk found two kilograms of cocaine.
Both Parker and Dickey were indicted with possession with intent to distribute in the first degree and possession of cocaine in the
third degree. See id. at 474, 706 A.2d at 183. Dickey made a pre-trial
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motion to suppress the cocaine evidence, claiming that although the
trooper's initial stop was reasonable the subsequent detainment and

intrusion were unreasonable. See id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, denied the defendant's motion. See id. The trial court based the ruling on the following four conclusions:
(1) the stop was proper because the
trooper observed that the car was moving slowly; (2) the defendant
produced no registration for the vehicle; thus, the glove compartment search was reasonable; (3) as part of the investigation into
ownership of the car, the decision to move the men and the vehicle
to the barracks was reasonable; and (4) Dickey's eventual consent
was valid because the sniff of the narcotics detection dog was not a
search and the dog's signal gave the trooper probable cause to conduct a search of the car. See id. Dickey then pled guilty with respect
to the first count but reserved his right to appeal the judge's ruling
denying the suppression motion. See id. The trial judge subsequently sentenced him to a seven-year term. See id.
The NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the
decision of the trial court. See id. Noting that the only issue before
the court was whether the time of detention between the original
stop and the probable cause foundation was reasonable, the appellate court agreed with Dickey's concession that the trooper was justified in stopping the two men in the first place. See id. The court further found that the trooper was fully justified in detaining the men
and the car because there was enough support for reasonable suspicion. See id. The appellate division explained that the trooper was
merely exercising his duty to investigate the car's ownership, as well
as whether the car contained narcotics. See id. Moreover, the appellate division added, even if the trooper improperly detained Dickey,
the illegality of the arrest would not hinder prosecution because detention of the car alone produced the evidence. See id. at 475, 706
A.2d at 183.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey consequently granted
Dickey's certification petition. See id. Reversing the decision of the
appellate division, the court clarified that the length of Dickey's detention and the degree of personal intrusion amounted to a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 472, 706 A.2d at 182.
The supreme court also found inadmissible the evidence obtained
from the tainted search and remanded the case to the trial court for
suppression of the cocaine. See id. at 472, 486, 706 A.2d at 182, 189.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice O'Hern commenced the
analysis by emphasizing the significance of the Fourth Amendment.
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See id. at 475, 706 A.2d at 183. The justice first highlighted the
Fourth Amendment's guarantee that people be secure from
"'unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Id. (quoting U.S. Const.
amend. V). The court then announced that an automobile stop is
protected by this guarantee. See id., 706 A.2d at 184. Such a stop is
reasonable, Justice O'Hern explained, only if an officer possesses
probable cause to be certain that a crime has occurred. See id. The
justice explained that the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio created a dualpronged test for courts to use in determining whether an investigative stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 471,
476, 706 A.2d at 182, 184 (citing 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). The first
prong of the test, the court maintained, asks whether the original action by the officer was justified. See id. at 476, 706 A.2d at 184 (citing
Tery, 392 U.S. at 20). The New Jersey high court decided that the
first prong of the Terry test was not at issue in this case because
Dickey stipulated that the trooper possessed the requisite level of
probable cause for the initial stop to be lawful. See id. The second
prong of the test, the court observed, asks whether the scope of the
officer's action was reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the initial stop. See id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). Justice
O'Hern asserted that the second prong was at issue in this case because Dickey claimed that the detainment period was excessive under the Fourth Amendment. See id. Therefore, the justice explained, the pertinent question was whether the length of time
between the initial detention and the ultimate consent to search was
reasonably related to the circumstances of the stop. See id.
The supreme court cautioned that there is no specific time duration set forth under the Terry test. See id. The court acknowledged,
however, that the United States Supreme Court has set forth guidelines that may help in determining whether the duration of detention is reasonable in any given case. See id. at 477, 706 A2d at 184.
Justice O'Hern continued by explaining that under this method,
courts can examine whether the officer used diligent haste in quickly
investigating his suspicions. See id. Another guideline the justice examined is the "'narrowly drawn'" Terry exception that permits an intrusion that does not amount to a full arrest because it involves a different level of imposition on individual freedom. See id., 706 A-2d at
184-85 (citation omitted). In addition, the court noted, the intrusion is permissible because the government may have a substantial
interest in combating imminent criminal activity that outweighs an
individual's privacy interest. See id., 706 A.2d at 185.
The dispositive question under the Terry exception, Justice
O'Hern reasoned, is what produces the difference between an inves-
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tigative stop and an unduly intrusive de facto arrest. See id. at 478,
706 A.2d at 185. The justice answered this question by listing factors
set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States. See id. at 479,
706 A.2d at 185. Time is a factor, the court posited, because if a stop
involves unnecessary delay it extends too long in duration. See id.
Fear and humiliation are factors, the supreme court explained, if the
degree is sufficiently egregious. See id. Transportation of a suspect
to a different location is also a factor, the court contended, as well as
isolation of a suspect by the police. See id. Other factors, Justice
O'Hern emphasized, include "subjecting a suspect to unnecessary
delays, handcuffing him, or confining him in a police car." Id., 706
A.2d at 186 (citations omitted).
The supreme court next applied the Fourth Amendment principles and guidelines to the facts of the case before the court. See id.
First, the court questioned whether the detention of Dickey was too
long in duration. See id. Justice O'Hern reiterated Dickey's concession that the initial stop by the trooper was valid. See id. The justice
commended the trooper's decision by recognizing that traffic regulations are routinely enforced when police act upon observed violations. See id. Moreover, the court noted, the inquiry may be broadened generally if an officer's reasonable inquiries give rise to
unrelated suspicions. See id. at 479-80, 706 A.2d at 186. The court
concluded that Dickey's failure to provide registration and insurance
documents, as well as his failure to furnish the name of the registered owner, justified broadening the investigation. See id. at 480,
706 A.2d at 186. The supreme court, however, criticized the
trooper's decision to continue detainment of Dickey after determining that the vehicle was not stolen. See id. at 481, 706 AX2d at 186-87.
The court then evaluated duration limits for detainment. See
id., 706 A-2d at 187. According to the United States Supreme Court,
Justice O'Hern observed, a twenty-minute detainment is reasonable
when the defendant acts to extend the duration and the officers act
diligently, but a ninety-minute detainment is unreasonable when the
officers are not diligent. See id. Additionally, the justice proffered,
other courts have set the following standards: forty-five, fifty, sixty,
and seventy-five minutes are not unreasonable detainment periods.
See id. The court declared, however, that no case has upheld a twohour detainment. See id. at 482, 706 A.2d at 187. Therefore, the
court determined that Dickey's four-hour detention exceeded
Fourth Amendment boundaries. See id. at 479, 706 A.2d at 186.
Justice O'Hern next questioned whether the nature of the detainment was minimally intrusive on Dickey's Fourth Amendment
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interests. See id. at 482, 706 A.2d at 187. The justice maintained that
the physical transportation of the handcuffed Dickey to a different
location via the trooper's patrol car, as well as the trooper's statement that Dickey was not free to leave upon arrival at the barracks,
indicated more than a minimal intrusion upon his Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 483, 706 A.2d at 188. The supreme court emphasized that although, Dickey was given the choice of accompanying the trooper to the barracks, in reality he retained no other
option. See id. Thus, the court expressed that the degree of intrusion on Dickey's liberty exceeded that authorized by the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 479, 706 A.2d at 186.
Justice O'Hern then addressed the State's argument that the illegality of Dickey's detention did not taint the evidence because the
police discovered the narcotics by searching the vehicle alone. See id.
at 483, 706 A.2d at 188. The justice examined the State's reliance
upon a statute that provides for vehicle impoundment by the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles. See id. (citing N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 39:5-47 (West 1990)). Rejecting this argument, the court
pointed out that the state statute is still subject to the limitations of
the Fourth Amendment, specifically as it provides for investigative
detention only for a reasonable time period and only when there are
ownership questions. See id. at 484, 706 A.2d at 188. Furthermore,
the court reasoned that the facts of this case involved detention of a
vehicle that was so intertwined with Dickey's detention as to effect
his seizure. See id. The supreme court reiterated that, although
Dickey was not under arrest until the narcotics were found, he could
not have realistically left the barracks. See id. Justice O'Hern distinguished Dickey's circumstances from cases where a person's luggage
is detained because in those situations the person is free to continue
on his way without his luggage and is not subjected to a threatening
environment of confinement or detention. See id. at 484-85, 706
A.2d at 188-89. Therefore, the justice concluded that, due to the interrelatedness of the vehicle detention with Dickey's detention, the
Fourth Amendment limitations upon the trooper's conduct apply to
the vehicle search as well. See id. at 485, 706 A.2d at 189.
Finally, the court suggested alternatives that the trooper in this
case could have chosen that would not have violated constitutional
boundaries. See id. For example, the supreme court explained, if
the trooper had permitted Parker and Dickey to continue on their
way by other means, or had not confined them to the barracks, the
vehicle detention may have been evaluated under a less stringent
standard. See id. Justice O'Hern even indicated that, had the
trooper used a computer database to determine whether Parker or
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Dickey possessed a criminal history, the result of this case could have
been avoided. See id. at 485-86, 706 A.2d at 189. The justice ruled,
however, that the actions of the trooper violated Fourth Amendment
boundaries because the length of detention and the degree of intrusion in this case have never been judicially upheld. See id. at 486, 706
A.2d at 189.
The supreme court concluded by both recognizing the importance of guidelines for law enforcement officials and by highlighting
one specific guideline. See id. Justice O'Hern reminded officers
that, if they possess articulable suspicion that a vehicle is housing
narcotics based upon the discovery of small drug amounts or drug
paraphernalia, detention is reasonable so long as it does not exceed
the short amount of time needed to bring a narcotics detection dog
to the scene. See id. The justice, however, reversed the decision of
the appellate division and remanded the case to the trial court because Dickey's detainment exceeded reasonable boundaries. See id.
By enforcing the Tery standards at the highest level of the state,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey has made a crucial pronouncement in State v. Dickey. The court has not only reiterated the importance of the Fourth Amendment, but has maintained the ideals of
personal protection from unfair persecution that are captured in the
spirit of the guarantee's language. Although some may criticize the
decision as another example of how criminals take advantage of
technicalities, the significance of the opinion would be overlooked
by that interpretation. The case is better understood by recognizing
that there is a delicate balance between the guaranteed protections
of the Fourth Amendment and the duty of the state to provide for
the public safety by investigating and prosecuting criminal behavior.
The court should be applauded for resisting the temptation to draw
an arbitrary "line in the sand" in setting forth the permissible duration for pre-arrest detention of suspects. Rather than specifically
creating a timeline for officers to follow in detainment situations, the
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court correctly reaffirmed that possible Terry violations must be determined on a case-by-case basis. In protecting the rights of the individual without unduly tying the hands of law enforcement, the supreme court has remarkably balanced the conflicting interests of
individuals and the state.
Tiffany A. Werner
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Collective Bargaining-Lay Teachers in
a Catholic Elementary School Have a State Constitutional Right to
Form Unions and Engage in Collective Bargaining Regarding
Secular Terms and Conditions of Employment Without Violating the
Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses of the United States
Constitution-South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the
InfantJesus Church Elementaiy Sch., 150 N.J. 575, 696 A.2d 709 (1997).
Plaintiff South Jersey Teachers Association (Association) contended that lay teachers decided by majority vote to employ the Association in each defendant school including that of the named defendant, St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church Elementary School.
See South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the InfantJesus
Church Elementary Sch., 150 N.J. 575, 581, 696 A.2d 709, 713 (1997).
The Catholic Diocese of Camden operates the defendant elementary
schools.
Acting in a representative capacity on behalf of the schools, a
Board of Pastors refused to recognize the Association as the teachers'
collective-bargaining representative unless the Association agreed to
sign a non-negotiable document entitled "Minimum Standards for
Organizations Wishing to Represent Lay Teachers in a Parish or Regional Catholic Elementary School in the Diocese of Camden"
(Minimum Standards). See id. at 582, 696 A2d at 713. The Minimum Standards limited the power of the Association in several ways,
including vesting complete and binding authority in the Board of
Pastors to determine the outcome of disputes and prohibiting the
Association from collecting fees or assessing dues from nonunion
members. The Association rejected the Minimum Standards because
it bargained away union members' rights prior to the union's certification and the initiation of the collective-bargaining process. In response, the defendant schools refused to recognize the Association
or to bargain collectively.
Consequently, the Association initiated litigation to compel the
schools to recognize the Association as the lay teachers' collectivebargaining representative and to compel the schools to partake in
collective bargaining regarding the terms and conditions of employment. See id. The Association asserted that the lay teachers in
the defendant schools are private employees protected under Article
I, Paragraph 19, of the NewJersey Constitution. See id. This provision provides that employees in the private sector possess the right
both to organize and bargain collectively while employees in the
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public sector have the right to "organize, present to and make known
to the State, or any of its political subdivisions or agencies, their
grievances and proposals through representatives of their own
choosing." Id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, granted the
schools' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, relying on the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
United States Constitution. See id. at 581, 582, 696 A.2d at 713. The
court concluded that imposing a requirement on the schools that
they must recognize the union would constitute impermissible, excessive entanglement between the Catholic Church and the state and
infringe upon the schools' free exercise rights. See id. at 582-83, 696
A.2d at 713.
The NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed the
lower court's decision, noting that only a Free Exercise Clause dilemma existed and that the quandary should be resolved in favor of
the Association. See id. at 583, 696 A.2d at 713. The appellate court
reasoned that the compelling state interest in collective bargaining,
which is inextricably linked to "'the preservation of industrial peace
and a sound economic order,'" outweighed the burden on the
schools' free exercise rights. Id. (quoting South Jersey Catholic Sch.
Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the InfantJesus ChurchElementary Sch., 290
NJ. Super. 359, 389, 675 A.2d 1155, 1171 (App. Div. 1996)). In addition, the court noted that distinctions between levels of religious indoctrination occurring in elementary and high schools were not controlling because the Diocese had been collectively bargaining at the
high school level for many years. See id Subsequently, the state supreme court granted certification. See id. at 581, 696 A.2d at 712.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the case should be
examined under both religion clauses of the United States Constitution and that requiring the schools to recognize the Association and
bargain collectively did not violate either religion clause. See id. at
587, 593, 602, 696 A.2d at 715, 718, 724. The supreme court examined (1) whether the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preempted the litigation in state court, (2) whether the court should
examine the facts under only one or both of the religion clauses of
the United States Constitution, (3) whether requiring the schools to
bargain collectively over the same secular terms that are negotiable
within the high school agreement violates the Establishment Clause,
and (4) whether that requirement violates the Free Exercise Clause.
See id. at 588-602, 696 A.2d 715-24.
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Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Coleman first analyzed
the preemption issue and rejected the schools' assertion that the
controversy was controlled by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). See id. at 584, 696 A.2d at 714. The court explained that
the schools' reliance on a prior United States Supreme Court decision regarding preemption of collective bargaining was misplaced
because the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) does not have
jurisdiction to mandate that church-operated schools recognize collective-bargaining units to represent their teachers. See id. (citing
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 506 (1979)). The justice then
reasoned that no government regulatory body analogous to the
NLRB exists in the present case that could monitor the parties' negotiations, thereby creating the potential for the type of government
entanglement prohibited by the religion clauses. See id. In addition,
the court recognized that state courts have subject matter jurisdiction over such litigation because the issue of litigation falls outside
the NLRA's scope. See id. Emphasizing that Article I, Paragraph 19,
of the state constitution seeks to protect workers not covered by the
NLRA, the court declared that the state constitution creates for private employees a fundamental right to bargain collectively. See id. at
585, 696 A-2d at 714.
Next, Justice Coleman examined whether enforcement of the
fundamental right of lay elementary school teachers to bargain collectively violates either religion clause of the Federal Constitution.
See id. Upon recounting the appellate court's analysis, which was
limited to Free Exercise Clause considerations only, the justice disagreed with the lower court and noted that the religion clauses were
inextricably linked. See id. at 585, 586, 696 A.2d at 714, 715. Explaining that the state constitution contains a similar provision that prohibits the state from establishing or preferring a certain religion, the
court commented that both the state and federal constitutions preclude the state from granting preference to one religions sect or another. See id. at 586, 696 A.2d at 715. The supreme court, however,
noted that, because the First Amendment of the United States Constitution applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment
and because the federal religion clauses are more detailed, the present case should be analyzed under the federal Constitution. See id.
Consequently, Justice Coleman stated that there was no need to determine whether the state constitution provides more protection. See
id.
Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, the court
posited that federal religion jurisprudence often requires a joint
analysis of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. See id. at
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587, 696 A.2d at 715. In addition, the court emphasized that a
"major crack" occurred in the "'wall of separation'" between church
and state in 1997 when the Supreme Court reversed a 1985 decision
requiring absolute separation in the school context. See id. (citing
Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997)). Acknowledging that excessive government entanglement can trigger both establishment and
free exercise concerns, Justice Coleman recognized that the distinction between both is often blurred and thereby requires a factsensitive analysis under each of the religion clauses. See id.
The court first analyzed the present case under the Establishment Clause, relying on the Supreme Court's constitutional requirements under the tripartite Lemon test: (1) the statute or state
action must have a secular purpose, (2) its primary effect must neither inhibit nor advance religion, and (3) the statute or state action
must not foster "'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Id. at 588, 696 A.2d at 715, 716 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)). In considering the first prong, the supreme court found that a secular purpose existed because Article I,
Paragraph 19, of the state constitution protects the financial welfare
of private employees by creating the right of parties to organize and
bargain collectively. See id., 696 A.2d at 716.
In analyzing the second prong of the Lemon test, regarding the
primary effect of the legislation, Justice Coleman concluded that the
primary effect of the collective-bargaining provision was not to inhibit or advance religion, but rather to mandate that private employers recognize and participate in collective bargaining with their employees' elected representatives. See id. at 589, 696 A.2d at 716.
Further, the justice observed that the Diocese's prior participation
since 1984 in collective bargaining with lay high school teachers regarding secular terms and conditions of employment has neither inhibited the schools' religion nor constituted indoctrination. See id.
at 589, 590, 696 A.2d at 716, 717.
Reiterating that the appropriate inquiry under the third prong
of the Lemon test is whether excessive entanglement exists between
church and state, the court acknowledged that an incidental overlap
is inevitable and absolute separation is impossible. See id. at 590, 591,
696 A.2d at 717. The supreme court reaffirmed, however, that the
"'wall of separation'" as a metaphor was a helpful signpost. See id. at
591, 696 A.2d at 717. Justice Coleman then acknowledged awareness
that children are impressionable and vulnerable to indoctrination
but stated that there is no constitutionally relevant distinction between elementary and secondary school students. See id. at 591-92,
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696 A.2d at 718. Nonetheless, the justice explained that pursuant to
Article I, Paragraph 19, of the New Jersey Constitution, mandating
collective bargaining over secular issues does not entangle the state
in imposing religious beliefs or specific terms upon opposing parties.
See id. at 592, 696 A.2d at 718. To hold otherwise, the supreme court
noted, would be to overlook collective bargaining's premise, which is
to bring parties together and allow them to negotiate their disagreements without state interference. See id.
Consequently, Justice Coleman concluded that the state constitution requires only that the Diocese acknowledge the lay teachers'
fundamental right to bargain collectively regarding secular terms
and conditions of employment as mandated by the agreement with
the lay secondary school teachers. See id. The justice explained that
the Diocese would not be required to negotiate any terms pertaining
to religious issues and that the state was precluded from articulating
which terms must be negotiated or included in the ultimate agreement. See id. at 592-93, 696 A.2d at 718. Therefore, the court held
that requiring the schools to negotiate with the Association regarding terms and conditions contained in the high school agreement
would not violate the Establishment Clause. See id. at 593, 696 A.2d
at 718.
Next, the court analyzed whether requiring the schools to engage in collective bargaining with the lay teachers is unconstitutional
because it violates the Free Exercise Clause. See id. Before Justice
Coleman enunciated the appropriate analysis, the court summarized
recent jurisprudence and legislation regarding the free exercise of
religion, culminating in Congress's enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). See id at 593, 594, 595, 696
A.2d at 719, 720. The justice explained that RFRA required a state to
demonstrate that its interest was sufficiently compelling to infringe
upon the free exercise of religion and mandated that the state use
the least restrictive means in achieving its goal. See id. at 595, 696
A.2d at 720. The justice noted that RFRA was enacted in response to
the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which
upheld a generally applicable and facially neutral law even though it
imposed an incidental burden on the free exercise of religion. See
id. at 595, 696 A.2d at 719, 720 (citing 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990)).
Further, the court acknowledged that Smith was a departure from the
Supreme Court's prior case law that required the state to demonstrate it had a compelling interest in enacting a law that burdened
the free exercise of religion. See id. at 594, 595, 696 A.2d at 719, 720
(citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 465 U.S. 205, 220 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)).
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Noting that the appellate court analyzed the present litigation
under RFRA's compelling interest standard and least restrictive
means requirement, Justice Coleman indicated that the Supreme
Court has since struck down RFRA as unconstitutional because, in
enacting RFRA, Congress impermissibly enacted substantive law
rather than remedial or preventative legislation. See id. at 596, 696
A.2d at 720 (citing City of Boerne v. Faores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)).
The justice also remarked that in striking down RFRA the supreme
court abandoned the least restrictive means requirement of the statute. See id. at 597, 696 A.2d at 721.
Consequently, Justice Coleman applied the Smith standard, a
standard that does not use the compelling interest standard unless
the regulatory law affects the Free Exercise Clause and another fundamental constitutional protection. See id. The justice also rejected
the Sherbert balancing test, which requires a law that substantially
burdens religious conduct to be justified by a compelling interest.
See id. In applying the Smith standard, the court determined that,
because Article I, Paragraph 19, of the state constitution is a law of
general application, it is neutral because it does not seek to regulate
religious belief or conduct but rather seeks to preserve the economic
well being of private employees. See id. Therefore, the supreme
court concluded that the state constitution does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause because it is facially neutral, even if it incidentally affects the free exercise of religion. See id. at 597-98, 696 A.2d at 721.
In conducting the Free Exercise Clause analysis, Justice Coleman also rejected the schools' contentions that employers have a
right not to associate when the employers' decisions would compromise the employees' rights to associate pursuant to the state constitution. See id. at 598, 696 A.2d at 722. Further, the justice emphasized that the rights of private employees to unionize and bargain
collectively constitutes a compelling interest that outweighs the employers' rights to decide whether to associate. See id. at 599, 696 A.2d
at 722. The court also rejected the schools' assertions that allowing
teachers to unionize interferes with the parents' rights to direct their
children's upbringing without government interference. See id.
Thus, Justice Coleman agreed with the appellate court and concluded that the state, not the schools, has a compelling interest in
permitting private employees to engage in collective bargaining and
to unionize over secular terms and conditions of employment. See id.
at 600, 696 A.2d at 722.
Next, the court reemphasized that lay teachers have a fundamental right to unionize and that the state's compelling interest was
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premised upon the "'preservation of industrial peace and a sound
economic order.'" Id., 696 A.2d at 722-23 (citation omitted). Further, the supreme court reiterated that the lack of any protective,
state agency analogous to the NLRB augmented the need for legal
relief from state courts. See id., 696 A.2d at 723. Justice Coleman
reasoned that the courts are entitled to provide such relief provided
they maintain a stance of neutrality in applying legal principles. See
id. The justice also noted that the schools' refusal to bargain collectively with lay elementary school teachers over secular terms and
conditions was inconsistent with its willingness to contract and bargain individually with lay elementary school teachers and negotiate
collectively with lay secondary school teachers. See id. at 601, 696
A.2d at 723. Finally, the court rejected the schools' ministerial defense and concluded thatjust because lay teachers may perform ministerial functions in teaching does not preclude the schools from
bargaining collectively with the Association. See id. at 601, 602, 696
A.2d at 723, 724.
Consequently, the court held that requiring the schools to bargain collectively with the Association, as dictated by Article I, Paragraph 19, of the NewJersey Constitution, regarding the secular terms
and conditions of employment violates neither the Establishment
nor Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution. See id. at
602, 696 A.2d at 724. Modifying and affirming the appellate court's
opinion, the supreme court then remanded the case to the chancery
division to direct an official representational election if one had not
already occurred. See id. If, however, the teachers already voted in
favor of representation by the Association, Justice Coleman ordered
the schools to recognize the Association as the representative of the
lay elementary school teachers and to bargain collectively with the
Association regarding secular terms and conditions of employment.
See id.
The NewJersey Supreme Court's analysis in South Jersey Catholic
School Teachers Organization precludes the Catholic Church from using the religion clauses of the United States Constitution as a sword.
Recognizing that significant overlap exists between the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses of the United States Constitution, the
court conducted a thorough analysis that reflects the tensions created by the two clauses. Nonetheless, the court refused to allow the
Diocese of Camden to invoke inappropriately these clauses in such a
way that ignores the fundamental right of private sector employees
to unionize and negotiate secular terms, a right derived from Article
I, Paragraph 19, of the NewJersey Constitution.
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Indisputably, Catholic schools and other religious entities are
entitled to their religious autonomy without interference by the
state. In fact, the court recognized that our nation's founding fathers sought separation between the church and the state when they
drafted the religion clauses of the United States Constitution. As the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence has demonstrated, however, absolute
separation between religion and the state is impossible. Nonetheless, the court's decision to require the Diocese and the Catholic
elementary schools within its operations to recognize the Association
as a bargaining representative of lay teachers was consistent with Supreme Courtjurisprudence.
Further, as the court noted, Article I, Paragraph 19, of the state
constitution provides constitutional protection of a fundamental
right, the right to unionize and bargain collectively. The court correctly limited that right to secular terms such as wages and specific
benefit plans. For the court to permit more and allow the Association to negotiate non-secular terms, such as curriculum and the inclusion of daily prayers therein, would unquestionably amount to a
violation of the Free Exercise Clause because the state would be controlling the structure of the Catholic schools. Further, for the court
to allow the Association to negotiate whether to teach Buddhism or
Islam would constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause because it would allow the state to interfere with the essence of the
Catholic mission of a Catholic school. The court's holding is not so
broad as to allow the state to advance or inhibit a particular religion.
Instead, the court astutely recognized that the schools cannot use
the Federal Constitution under false pretenses to supersede the fundamental rights afforded by the state constitution.
MaraE. Zazzali

